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models of job performance which were estimated in samples of job incumbents are after corrections for 
measurement error and selection on the dependent variable yield unbiased estimates of true population 
relationships--that is almost certainly wrong. The biases introduced into the calculation by this 
assumption lower the estimated costs of introducing random assignment of workers to jobs, exaggerate 
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ABSTRACT
Greater use of employment tests for selecting workers will have important
effects on the economy. First, the rewards for developing the competencies
measured by the tests will rise and this will increase the supply of workers
with these competencies. Employment tests predict job performance because
they measure or are correlated with a large set of developed abilities which
are causally related to productivity and not because they are correlated with
an inherited ability to learn. Our economy currently under-rewards the
achievements that are measured by these tests and the resulting weak incentives
for hard study have contributed to the low levels of achievement in math and
science.
Greater use of tests to select workers will also change the sorting of
workers across jobs. Its impacts on total output depends on the extent to
which the developed abilities measured by employment tests--academic
achievement, perceptual speed and psychomotor skills--have larger impacts
on worker productivity in dollars in some occupations than in others. This
question is examined by analyzing GATB revalidation data on 31,399 workers
in 159 occupations and by reviewing the literature on how the standard
deviation of worker productivity varies across occupations. The analysis
finds that indeed such differentials exist and therefore that reassigning
workers who do well on a test to occupations where the payoff to the talent
is particularly high will increase aggregate output. The magnitude of the
output effect was estimated by reweighting the GATB revalidation data to
be representative of the 71 million workers in the non-professional and non-
managerial occupations and then simulating various resorting scenarios.
Selecting new hires randomly lowered aggregate output by at least $129 billion
or 8 percent of the compensation received by these workers. An upper bound
estimate of the productivity benefits of reassigning workers on the basis
of three GATB cOmPOsites is that it would raise output by $111 billion or
6.9 percent of compensation. Reassignment based on tests had an adverse impact
on Blacks and Hispanics but greatly reduced gender segregation in the work
place and substantially improved the average wage of the jobs held by women.
These results are based on a maintained assumption--the models of job
performance which were estimated in samples of job incumbents are after
corrections for measurement error and selection on the dependent variable
yield unbiased estimates of true population relationships--that is almost
certainly wrong. The biases introduced into the calculation by this assumption
lower the estimated costs of introducing random assignment of workers to jobs,
exaggerate the benefits of greater test use and exaggerate the changes in
demographic cOmPOsition of occupational work forces.
The paper concludes with a discussion of ways in which employment tests
can simultaneously strengthen incentives to learn, improve sorting and minimize
adverse impacts on minority groups.
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THE ECONOMICS OF EMPLOYMENT TESTING
Employment testing appears to be destined to have a growing role in the
allocation of workers to jobs. The skills measured by these tests are becoming
increasingly important. Unskilled manufacturing jobs are moving to Asia,
Africa and Latin America. The only way American manufacturers can stay in
the US and survive is to automate. Automation, however, requires a highly
skilled and flexible work force (Adler 1986). Employers are complaining that
many new hires and long service employees do not have the reading, math and
reasoning skills necessary to learn the demanding jobs being generated by
the new information technology. At the same time that the demand for workers
competent in basic skills and problem solving is rising, the supply appears
to be contracting. The test scores of high school students fell during the
1970s and while they have rebounded somewhat, they have not yet returned to
their former level.
These forces are causing American manufacturers to become more selective
when they hire new workers. At the same time, the legal impediments to the
use of aptitude tests appear to be diminishing (Scarf 1988). Even if the
trend of court decisions accepting the claims of validity generalization were
to be reversed, employers and society can gain most of the benefits of improved
selection by top down hiring from a ranking generated by race normed test
scores (Schmidt 1988; Wigdor and Hartigan 1988).1 As a result, there is no
necessary conflict between minority interests and greater use of tests in
employment selection. As a result, test use appears to be growing. A 1985
American Society for Personnel Administration survey found that 24 percent
of the firms responding had increased testing in the past year and another
44 percent were considering an increase in the amount of testing they do.
Greater use of employment tests will have three kinds of effects on
the economy. First, greater use of tests increases the rewards for developing
the skills and competencies assessed by the tests and as a consequence the
supply of these skills and competencies will likely increase.
paper examines this effect, the incentive effect.
Part I of the
The second and third effects of greater use of tests by employers arise
from their impact on the sorting of workers across jobs and occupations.
Employment tests yield information on the probable job performance of job
applicants that is not available from other sources (Hunter 1986, Schmidt
21988) . If a trait measured by a test has a larger effect on dollars of output
in occupation A than in occupation B, recruiting people who do well on the
test into occupation A will increase national output. This is the second
effect of greater test use. The third effect that greater use of tests for
selection is likely to have is on the gender breakdown and ethnic makeup of
particular occupations. These two sorting effects of employment testing are
examined in the second part of the paper. The paper concludes with a
discussion of the incentive and sorting efficiency effects of different methods
of selecting workers for jobs and then recommends an approach to employment
testing which simultaneously strengthens incentives to learn and improves
the sorting of workers across jobs.
PART I. INCENTIVE EFFECTS
The prevalence and nature of employment testing powerfully influences
incentives to develop particular skills and competencies. Greater use by
employers of tests measuring competence in reading, writing, mathematics and
problem solving will increase the supply of these competencies. The effects
of testing on the aggregate supply of skilled workers may be considerably
more important than its sorting effects. This tentative judgement follows
from four propositions which will be defended below:
1. The tests at issue measure malleable developed abilities which are
causally related to individual productivity (ie. they are not
serving as proxies for inherited learning ability).
2. The labor market under-rewards the developed abilities measured by
these tests.
3. Greater use of employment tests measuring a broad range of
cognitive achievements such as the ASVAB would increase the
economic rewards for learning.
4. People would devote more time and energy to developing these
abilities if the rewards were greater.
The first of these propositions is defended in the first two sections
of Part I. Section 1.1 presents evidence that gains in the quantity and
quality of education and improvements in the cultural environment have caused
major increases in average levels of achievement in the skills these tests
assess. Because IQ scores of blacks and whites were advancing at roughly
3equal rates, the gap between them remained relatively constant for a long
period of time. Recently, however, the gap has begun to close apparently
in response to the nation's efforts to raise the quality of education received
by those from disadvantaged backgrounds. Section 1.2 argues that the
distinction between an aptitude test and an achievement test is more in the
eye of the beholder than in the psychometrics. The conclusion drawn from
the evidence presented in these two sections is that employment tests predict
job performance because they measure or are correlated with a large set of
developed abilities which are causally related to productivity and not because
they are correlated with an inherited ability to learn.
Section 1.3 presents evidence on proposition # 2 and # 3: our economy
currently underrewards the academic achievements that are measured by
employment tests. The minimal use of tests of academic achievement or
credentials based on them as devices for selecting employees is in large part
responsible for the failure of the labor market to appropriately reward effort
and achievement in high school. Section 1.4 presents evidence for proposition
# 4. It examines incentives to study hard in high school, and presents
evidence that more powerful labor market rewards for learning are needed to
strengthen these incentives.
1.1 The Implications of Secular Trends in IQ
for the Nature/Nurture Debate
The cultural, economic and educational environment to which children
and adults are exposed has improved dramatically in the last 70 years.2 If
proposition # 1 is true, these improvements in the cultural and educational
environment should have resulted in major gains in the mean scores on IQ type
tests. Since the gene pool of the nation can not have changed very much during
the last 70 years, a genetic explanation of differences in IQ predicts almost
no change in the mean IQ of the population. Consequently, the existence and
magnitude of secular trends in the mean IQ of national populations is important
evidence that the environment has major impacts on the developed abilities
measured by employment tests.
This section of the paper, therefore, provides a review of 5 kinds of
evidence on trends in the academic achievement and mean IQ of national
populations and racial groups:
4a Cross-section and longitudinal data on the relationship between
and scores on individually administered IQ tests.
age
a Time series data on the mean IQ of American adults on individually
administered IQ tests.
a Time series data on the scores of American students on group
administered paper and pencil IQ tests.
a Time series data on the mean IQ of students and young adults in
Western nations.
other
a Trend data on Black/White differences in academic achievement and
IQ.
This review concludes that for every group and in every nation for which there
is data, IQ has risen over time. Even tests which were originally designed
to measure inherited learning ability--individually administered IQ tests-
-exhibit this improvement. Rates of gain have not, however, been stable over
time or equal across nations or racial groups.
Gains on Individually Administered IQ Tests--
Crass-section and Longitudinal Data
In cross section data the relationship between raw IQ scores and age
is curvilinear. The highest scores are typically obtained by people in their
twenties. Representative results from the standardization samples of the
WAIS and WAIS-R, are presented in Table 1. Looking down the columns one can
see that for those over age 30, raw scores for Full Scale IQ appear to decline
.027 SDs per year and Verbal IQ scores appear to decline .013 to .014 SDs
per year. A cross-section relationship like this is a mixture of aging effects
and cohort effects. If the lower scores for those over the age of 30 or 35
reflect deterioration of the intellect over time, the cross-section data are
consistent with the mean IQ of the population being stable over time. If,
however, scores on these tests do not decline as one grows older, the cross
section pattern implies that older cohorts had a lower IQ throughout their
lifetime. This, in turn, implies that as new, better educated cohorts replaced
older cohorts the mean IQ of the population advanced.
Longitudinal studies which retest individuals over long intervals of
time are one way to distinguish between the aging and cohort explanations
of the cross-section pattern. These studies have found that Verbal IQ rises
with age and that only scores on the timed Performance IQ subtests decline
5with age. Full scale IQ which combines the two types of tests does not
deteriorate at least until age 60 and above (Bayley 1955; Bradway, et ala
1958; Schaie and Strather 1968; Schaie and Hertzog 1983). This, then, implies
that cohort differences must be responsible for the lower raw IQ scores of
those over age 35 and that the mean IQ of the population must be rising
secularly.
Gains on Individually Administered IQ Tests-
U. S. Time Series Data
It has been argued, however, that practice effects may last the full
7+ year interval between test administrations in these studies, so the
improvements in IQ with age may be illusory. Therefore, other kinds of data
which are not subject to practice effects must be examined to obtain conclusive
proof that the mean IQ of the population has risen over time. What is needed
is large random samples of the adult population which have been given the
same or equated IQ tests many years apart. The standardization studies for
the WAIS and WAIS-R adult IQ tests provide the necessary stratified random
samples of the population, and five studies have been published which equate
the two tests. The equating studies determined the correspondence of scores
on the earlier and later versions of the test by administering both tests
in counterbalanced order (to neutralize practice effects) to a sample of
people. These studies found that it was easier to get a high score on the
WAIS which had been standardized on the U.S. population during 1953-54 than
on the WAIS-R which was standardized between 1976 and 1980. The implied gain
in IQ for the population 16 to 70 years old was 6.37 IQ points (.425 SDs)
on full scale IQ and 6.48 IQ points (.432 SDs) on verbal IQ between 1953 and
1978. (Wechsler 1981, Urbina, Golden & Ariel 1982; Smith 1983; Mishra & Brown
1983; Lippold & Claiborn 1983). These equating studies have been used to
calculate the relationship between column 1 and 2 and between column 4 and
5 of Table 1. Yearly rates of gain in IQ for each age group are presented
in column 3 and 6 of table 1. The IQ gains for cohorts over the age of 25
were generally around .02 SDs per year.3
The equating studies comparing other IQ tests obtain similar results:
IQ scores on the older tests are almost invariably higher and the magnitude
of the difference is linearly related to the time between standardizations
of the tests (Thorndike 1975; Flynn 1984). Flynn finds that the rate of
6increase in Full Scale IQ is remarkably consistent across age groups and time
periods. Analyzing 77 equating studies with a total of 7431 subjects involving
18 different IQ test comparisons, he concludes that between 1932 and 1978
the gains have averaged 3.1 IQ points or .21 standard deviations per decade
(Flynn 1987).
Comparisons of white enlisted soldiers serving in World War I and II
provide still another measure of secular trends in IQ scores. When a
stratified random sample of white WWII recruits took a test very similar to
the test that all literate WWI army recruits had taken, they scored .73
standard deviations or 11 IQ point better. (Tuddenham, 1948).4 Since only
the literate 83 percent of white soldiers took the Alpha during WWI, this
comparison understates the IQ gain for the population as a whole.
IQ Gains Among American Students
A third source of data on IQ trends is provided by studies of trends
in the IQ of students. A search was conducted for studies reporting the
results of administering the same IQ test to different cohorts of students
at the same school. Only a few such studies were found all of them covering
the period between the two world wars. A study of the school children of
eastern Tennessee found that, over the decade of the 1930s, 1st graders gained
11 IQ points and 7th and 8th graders gained 10.8 IQ points (more than two-
thirds of a standard deviation). (Wheeler, 1942). A study of two high schools
in the midwest found no change in the mean IQ of the students at a small rural
high school and a 5 point increase between 1923 and 1942 at a large high school
serving a small city and the surrounding county (Finch, 1946). Johnson (1935)
found a 3 point gain in IQ between 1925 and 1935 at Grover Cleveland High
School in st. Louis. Roessel's (1937) comparison of the students in three
Minnesota high Schools in 1920 and 1934 and Rundquist's (1936) comparison
of Minneapolis high school students in 1929 and 1934 both found increases
in IQ.
For the post-WWII era, the best data on trends in the academic achievement
of students nearing completion of compulsory schooling comes from the Iowa
Test of Educational Development (ITED), a battery of achievement tests very
similar to the ACT (Forsyth 1987).5 Because about 95 percent of the public
and private schools in the state of Iowa regularly participated in the testing
7program, the analysis of trends in ITED data for Iowa is not plagued by
changing selectivity of the population taking the test in the way the SAT
and ACT are. The overall trend of ITED scores for Iowa high school seniors
has been up, but progress has not been steady. There was an increase of .426
population standard deviations between 1942 and 1967, a decline of .26
population standard deviations between 1967 and 1979, and then a rebound of
.185 population standard deviations between 1979 and 1987.
IQ Trends in Europe, Canada and Japan
Improvements in the mean IQ of the population have been even more dramatic
in Europe and Japan than in the United States. James R. Flynn (1987) has
collected studies of the trend in mean IQ of representative samples of youth
and young adults for 14 advanced nations. Table 2 reports the findings of
the studies for which there can be no debate about the representativeness
of the populations tested. In every country for which data was available
(including the countries with weaker studies), there were major gains on IQ
tests during the post war period. The findings for France, Netherlands, Norway
and Belgium are especially strong. In these countries unchanged tests were
given to all male 18 year olds entering their universal military training
obligation. In just 25 years, for example; the IQ scores of French 18 year
olds rose 25 points on the Ravens, a "culture reduced" test of abstract problem
solving ability, and 9.4 points on a more conventional test of verbal and
mathematical intelligence. In general, test score gains were smaller on math
and verbal tests than on tests of abstract problem solving ability and the
performance components of Wechsler IQ tests. The countries such as Japan,
Belgium, France and Netherlands that have above average rates of gain in IQ
tend also to have above average rates of productivity growth. This correlation
probably reflects the combined effect of the IQ gains on national productivity
and the effect of improved standards of living on IQ.
Racial Gaps in Academic Achievement and IQ
Gottfredson (1988) argues that racial differentials in IQ are very
stubborn and that, consequently, color blind use of employment tests will
probably have an adverse impact on blacks for generations. Citing Gordon
(in press), she reports that the IQ gap between whites and blacks has been
relatively stable ever since 1918. Since mean IQ levels of the entire
8population have risen substantially during the 20th century, this implies
that the mean IQ of blacks has been rising as well. The failure of the gap
to close during the first 50 years of psychometric testing takes on much less
significance when one realizes that both groups were rapidly improving.
In more recent data, however, the gap is closing. Blacks born after
the civil rights revolution are doing much better in school than those born
prior to 1960. The evidence is presented in Table 3. In the first National
Assessment of Educational Progress black high school seniors born around 1954
were 5.3 grade level equivalents behind their white counterparts in reading
proficiency. In the first assessment of math skills, black high school seniors
born around 1957 were 4 grade level equivalents behind in mathematics. The
most recent National Assessment data for 1986 reveals that the gap in math
proficiency has been cut to 2.9 grade level equivalents in just 12 years and
that the reading gap has been cut to 2.6 years in just 15 years. Koretz's
(1986 Appendix E) analysis of data from state testing programs supports the
NAEP findings. Gains of this magnitude contradict Gottfredson's very
pessimistic assessment and suggest that Head start, Title I and other
compensatory interventions are having an impact. The schools attended by
most black students are still clearly inferior to those attended by white
students so further reductions in the school quality differentials will
probably produce further reductions in academic achievement differentials.
The evidence just reviewed implies that (1) the mean IQ of national
populations has been growing over time and (2) the relative IQ of different
national populations and ethnic groups has been changing over time. Since
the genetic makeup of these populations cannot have changed appreciably in
just one or two generations, these results clearly imply that changes in the
environment--education, nutrition, culture and economic status--can and do
produce substantial changes in the developed abilities that are measured by
IQ tests and employment aptitude tests.
1.2 Is There a Psychometric Distinction
Between Achievement and Aptitude?
Broad spectrum achievement tests correlate almost as highly with verbal
and mathematical aptitude tests as alternate forms of the same test correlate
with each other. The similarity of subject content is a much more important
determinant of correlations between tests than is the distinction between
9aptitude and achievement. This is clearly visible when one examines
attenuation corrected correlations between College Board achievement and
aptitude tests. When subject matter is similar, corrected correlations between
aptitude and achievement tests are close to one. The corrected correlation
between Math I and the Math SAT is .93 and the correlation between English
Literature and the Verbal SAT is .93 (College Board 1984, 1987). When subject
matter differs, correlations are much lower. Corrected for attenuation, Math
SATs correlate .721 with Verbal SATs, .738-.756 with science achievement and
.526-.576 with history achievement. Corrected for attenuation, Verbal SATs
correlate .789-.831 with history, .793 with biology and .625-.643 with
chemistry and physics.G
There are good reasons for high correlations between past achievement
and scores on aptitude tests designed to predict future achievement. Past
achievement aids learning because the tools (e.g. reading and mathematics)
and concepts taught early in the curriculum are often essential for learning
the material that comes later. Furthermore, aptitude tests are validated
on later achievement levels, not on rates of change of achievement.
Consequently, the items that are included in paper and pencil aptitude tests
often look a lot like the items that appear on achievement tests. The tests
that do not fit this generalization, such as the WAIS-R's digit span, typically
have lower validity than other subtests or are measures of something altogether
different like short-term memory and psychomotor ability.
Further evidence on this issue is provided by the many studies which
have shown that school attendance raises scores on these aptitude tests (Lorge
1945; Husen 1951; Department of Labor 1970), and that taking a rigorous college
prep curriculum increases the gains on these tests between sophomore and senior
years of high school (Bishop 1985; Hotchkiss 1985). In recognition of the
fact that aptitude test scores are significantly influenced by educational
background, the College Board now describes the SAT as a measure of "developed
verbal and mathematical reasoning abilities (1987, p. 3)"
At this point it is important to address a potential objection to this
conclusion. Those who believe that IQ tests truly measure inherited learning
ability might argue that productivity is an outcome of on-the-job learning
rather than in-school learning, and that employment aptitude tests measure
inherited learning ability rather than outcomes of schooling that help one
10
do a job well. In this view, employment aptitude tests are good measures
of inherited learning ability because everyone receives roughly equivalent
instruction in the material covered by the test, therefore, differences in
knowledge at the end of instruction primarily reflect differences in inherited
learning ability. In my judgement, this view does not withstand scrutiny.
Many of its key predictions are contradicted by data. (1) If it were
true, we would expect childhood IQ tests to predict adult labor market success
just as well as adult GIA tests. In fact, when adult GIA tests compete with
childhood IQ tests, it is the adult test not the childhood test which has
by far the biggest effect on labor market success (Husen, 1969). (2) In
addition, we would expect culture reduced non-verbal IQ tests to be just as
good predictors of labor market success as a test of reading and writing
skills. In fact, a study of Kenyan workers has found that wages were
significantly effected by literacy but not by non-verbal IQ (Brossiere, Knight
and Sabot, 1985). (3) Furthermore, we would expect education obtained abroad
in non-English speaking countries to be just as good a signal of high inherited
learning ability (and therefore just as good a predictor of wage rates in
the U.S. economy) as education obtained in the U.S. or English speaking
countries. In fact, a year of schooling obtained in a non-English speaking
country has a much smaller effect on wage rates than a year of schooling
obtained in the U.S. or some other English-speaking country. (Chiswick, 1978).
(4) Finally, we would expect that controlling for genotype IQ (e.g. by
comparing identical twins) would reduce the effect of test scores on labor
market success to zero. Since siblings are genetically similar, we would
expect IQ's effect to diminish when siblings are being compared. In fact,
the effect of IQ (measured while in school) on labor market success is actually
greater when brothers are compared than in standard cross section regressions
(Olneck 1977).
These findings suggest that the associations between scores on employment
aptitude and IQ tests on the one hand and productivity and labor market success
on the other aris~ because the tests either directly measure developed
abilities that contribute to productivity or else correlate highly with such
abilities. Therefore, an increase in the incidence of these developed
abilities in the working population will increase national output. This raises
the question of what determines the incidence of these developed abilities
11
in the adult population. Propositions # 2, # 3 and # 4 summarize the findings
that will be presented in the next two subsections of the paper.
1.3 The Absence of Major Economic Rewards for Effort in High School
The decline in test scores and the poor performance of American students
on international mathematics and science tests has stimulated a great deal
of concern about the quality of education. An educational reform movement
has developed that is attempting to add rigor to the curriculum and improve
teaching. These are important objectives, and important progress has been
made. If, however, students are not motivated to study harder, the reform
initiatives will fail. Too little attention has been given to student
motivation. In the area of student motivation, employment testing potentially
has an important role to play.
Studies of time use and time on task in high school show that students
actively engage in a learning activity for only about half the time they are
scheduled to be in school. In 1980, high school students spent an average
of 3.5 hours per week on homework. When homework is added to engaged time
at school, the total time devoted to study, instruction, and practice is only
20 hours per week. By comparison, the typical senior spent 10 hours per
week in a part-time job and nearly 25 hours watching television.
occupies more of an adolescents time than learning.
Thus, TV
Even more important is the intensity of the student's involvement in
the process. Theodore Sizer described American high school students as
"docile, ccmpliant, and without initiative" (Sizer 1984). Coming to the same
conclusion, John Goodlad observed, "the extraordinary degree of student
passivity stands out" (Goodlad 1984). When teachers are asked what they feel
are the most important problems in education, more than 40% respond, "lack
of interest by students".
teachers to be demanding.
This lack of interest makes it very difficult for
Some teachers are able to overcome the obstacles and induce their students
to undertake hard learning tasks. But for most mortals the lassitude of the
students is too demoralizing. In too many classrooms an implicit agreement
prevails in which the students trade civility for lowered academic demands
(Sizer 1984). Most students view the costs of studying hard as much greater
12
than the benefits, so the peer group pressures the teacher to go easy.
too often teachers are forced to compromise their academic demands.
All
students are not, however, the only group that is apathetic. Stevenson,
Lee and Stigler's (1986) study of education in Taiwan, Japan and the u.s.
found that even though American children were learning the least in school,
American parents were the most satisfied with the performance of their local
schools. Why do Japanese and Taiwanese parents hold their children and their
schools to a higher standard than American parents?
The fundamental cause of the apathy and motivation problem is the way
student effort and achievement is recognized and reinforced. The educational
decisions of students and their parents are significantly influenced by the
costs (in money, time and psychological effort) and benefits (praise, prestige,
employment, wage rates, and job satisfaction) that result. The problem is
that while there are benefits to staying in high school, most students do
not benefit very much from working hard while in high school. This is in
large measure a consequence of the failure of the labor market to reward effort
and achievement in high school.
Students who plan to look for a job immediately after high school
generally see very little connection between their academic studies and their
future success in the labor market. Statistical studies of the youth labor
market confirm their skepticism about the economic benefits of studying hard:
For high school students, high school grades and performance on
academic achievement/aptitude tests have essentially no impact on
labor market success. They have -
--no effect on the chances of finding work when one is seeking
it during high school, and
--no effect on the wage rate of the jobs obtained while in high
school.(Hotchkiss, Bishop and Gardner 1982}
As one can see in table 5, for those who do not go to college full-
time, high school grades and test scores had -
--no effect on the wage rate of the jobs obtained immediately after
high school in Kang and Bishop's (1985) analysis of High School
and Beyond seniors and only a 1 to 4.7 percent increase in wages
per standard deviation (SD) improvement in test scores and grade
point average in Meyer's (1982) analysis of Class of 1972 data.
--a moderate effect on wage rates and earnings after 4 or 5 years
[Gardner (1982) found an effect of 4.8 percent per SD of
achievement and Meyer (1983) found an effect of 4.3 to 6.0
percent per SD of achievement],
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--a small effect on employment and earnings immediately after high
school.
In almost all entry-level jobs, wage rates reflect the level of the
job not the worker's productivity. Thus, the employer immeadiately
benefits from a worker's greater productivity. Cognitive abilities
and productivity make promotion more likely, but it takes time for
the imperfect sorting process to assign a particularly able worker
a job that fully uses that greater ability -- and pays accordingly.
The long delay before labor market rewards are received is important because
most teenagers are "now" oriented, so benefits promised for 10 years in the
future may have little influence on their decisions.
Although the economic benefits of higher achievement are quite modest
for young workers and do not appear until long after graduation, the benefits
to the employer (and therefore, to nation~l production) are immediately
apparent in higher productivity. This is the implication of the finding that
tests of reading, mathematics and problem solving ability are valid predictors
of job performance in most jobs.
Figure 1 compares the percentage impact of mathematical and verbal
achievement (specifically a one standard deviation difference in GPA and test
scores) on the productivity of a clerical worker, on wages of clerical workers,
and on the wages of all workers who have not gone to college7.B. Productivity
clearly increases more than wage rates. This implies that when a non-college-
bound student works hard in school and improves his or her academic
achievements the youth's employer benefits as well as the youth. The youth
is more likely to find a job, but not one with an appreciably higher wage.
The next sub-section examines reasons for the discrepancy.
Reasons for the Discrepancy between Wage Rates and Productivity on the Job
Employers are presumably competing for better workers. Why doesn't
competition result in much higher wages for those who achieve in high school
and have strong basic skills? The cause appears to be the lack of objective
information available to employers on applicant accomplishments, skills, and
productivity.
A 1987 survey of a stratified random sample of small and medium sized
employers who were members of the National Federation of Independent Business
(NFIB) found that aptitude test scores had been obtained in only 3.15 percent




























on the basis test scores is even more unusual. Prior to 1971, employment
testing was much more common. The cause of this change was the fear of costly
litigation over the business necessity and validity of aptitude tests. The
EEOC's codification of the APA's professional testing standards and its theory
of situational and subgroup differences in validity into federal law made
the required validation studies so costly it. discouraged almost all employers
from undertaking the effort (Friedman and Williams 1982).
Other potential sources of information on effort and achievement in high
school are transcripts and referrals from teachers who know the applicant.
Both these means are under used. In the NFIB survey, transcripts had been
obtained prior to the selection decision for only 13.7 percent of the hiring
events in which someone with 12 or fewer years of schooling was hired. If
a student or graduate gives written permission for a transcript to be sent
to an employer, the Buckley amendment obligates the school to respond. Many
high schools are not, however, responding to such requests. The experience
of Nationwide Insurance, one of Columbus, Ohio's most respected employers,
is probably representative of what happens in most communities. The company
obtains permission to get high school records from all young people who
interview for a job. It sent over 1,200 such signed requests to high schools
in 1982 and received only 93 responses. Employers reported that colleges
were much more responsive to transcript requests than high schools. High
schools have apparently designed their systems for responding to requests
for transcripts around the needs of college bound students not around the
needs of the students who seek a job immediately after graduating.
There is an additional barrier to the use of high school transcripts
in selecting new employees--when high schools do respond, it takes a great
deal of time. For Nationwide Insurance the response almost invariably took
more than 2 weeks. Given this time lag, if employers required transcripts
prior to making hiring selections, a job offer could not be made until a month
or so after an application had been received. Most jobs are filled much more
rapidly than that. The 1982 NCRVE employer survey of employers found that
83.5 percent of all jobs were filled in less than a month, and 65 percent
were filled in less than 2 weeks.
The only information about school experiences requested by most employers
is years of schooling, diplomas and certificates obtained, and area of
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specialization. Probably because of unreliable reporting and the threat of
EEOC litigation, only 16 percent of the NFIB employers asked the applicants
with 12 or fewer years of schooling to report their grade point average.
Hiring on the basis of recommendations by high school teachers is also
uncommon. In the NFIB survey, when someone with 12 or fewer years of schooling
was hired, the new hire had been referred or recommended by vocational teachers
only 5.5 percent of the time and referred by someone else in the high school
only 3.1 percent of the time.
Consequently, hiring selections and starting wage rates often do not
reflect the competencies and abilities students have developed in school.
Instead, hiring decisions are based on observable characteristics (such as
years of schooling and field of study) that serve as signals for the
competencies the employer cannot observe directly. As a result, the worker's
wage reflects the average productivity of all workers with the same set of
educational credentials rather than that individual's productivity or academic
achievement.
This evidence implies that the social benefits of developing one's verbal,
mathematical and scientific capabilities are considerably greater than the
private rewards. Despite their higher productivity, young workers who have
achieved in high school and who have done well on academic achievement tests
do not receive higher wage rates immediately after high school. The student
who works hard must wait many years to start really benefiting and even then
the magnitude of the wage and earnings effect--a 1 to 2 percent increase in
earnings per grade level equivalent on achievement tests--is considerably
smaller than the actual change in productivity that results.
1.4 Will Larger Economic Rewards for Learning
Induce Students to Study Harder?
Learning that is certified by a credential is rewarded handsomely.
magnitude of the earnings payoff to a credential has been shown to have
The
significant effects on the numbers of students entering college and choosing
specific majors (Freeman 1971, 1976). Learning not certified by a credential
is either not rewarded or only modestly rewarded. Consequently, there are
strong incentives to stay in school; but much weaker incentives to study hard
while in school. If students are to be motivated to devote more time and
energy to learning, they must believe their effort will be rewarded. If
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parents are to be induced to demand better schools and to spend the time
supervising homework, they too must believe that better teaching, a more
rigorous curriculum and hard study produces learning which will be rewarded
in the labor market. When, however, the only signals of learning
accomplishment that are available--eg. GPA and rank in class--describe one's
performance relative to close friends, the motivation to study and to demand
better schools is undermined.
The Zero-Sum Nature of Academic Competition in High School
The second root cause of the lack of real motivation to learn is peer
pressure against studying hard. Students report that "in most of the regular
classes... If you raise your hand more than twice in a class, you are called
a 'teachers pet.
'"
Its OK to be smart, you cannot help that. It is def initely
not OK to study hard to get a good grade. An important reason for this peer
pressure is that the academic side of school forces adolescents to compete
against close friends. Their achievement is not being measured against an
absolute or an external standard. In contrast to scout merit badges where
recognition is given for achieving a fixed standard of competence, the only
measures of achievement that receive attention in American schools are measures
of one's performance relative to one's close friends such as grades and rank
in class. When students try hard and excel in school, they are making things
worse for friends. Since greater effort by everyone cannot improve everyone's
rank in class, the group interest is for everyone to take it easy. At that
age peer friendships are all important, so informal pressure from the peer
group is able to induce most students to take it easy. All work groups have
ways of sanctioning "rate busters." High school students call them "brain
geeks", "grade grubbers" and "brown nosers".
Young people are not lazy. In their jobs after school and at football
practice they work very hard. In these environments they are not competing
against each other. They are working together as part of a team. Their
individual efforts are visible to their peers and appreciated by them. On
the sports field, there is no greater sin than giving up, even when the score
is hopelessly one sided. In too many high schools, when it comes to academics,
there is no greater sin than trying hard.
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Another reason for peer norms against studying is that most students
perceive the chance of receiving recognition for an academic achievement to
be so slim they have given up trying. At most high school awards ceremonies
the recognition and awards go to only a few--those at the very top of the
class. By 9th grade most students are so far behind the leaders, they know
they have no realistic chance of being perceived as academically successful.
Their reaction is often to denigrate the students who take learning seriously
and to honor other forms of achievement--athletics, dating, holding your liquor
and being "cool"--which offer them better chances of success.
The lack of standards for judging academic achievement that do not
involve comparisons with one's close friends and the resulting zero sum nature
of academic competition also influences the school board and the political
system. Parents can see that setting higher academic standards or hiring
better teachers will not improve their child's grade point average or rank
in class. Since the Scholastic Aptitude Test is intended to be curriculum
free, adding rigorous science, history and calculus courses to the curriculum
is unlikely to change SAT scores. In any case, doing well on the SAT matters
only for those who aspire to attend a small number of highly selective
colleges. The parents of children not planning to go to college have an even
weaker incentive to demand high standards. They believe that what counts
in the labor market is getting the diploma not learning algebra (and they
happen to be right). Higher standards might put at risk what is really
important--the diploma.
The real costs of mediocre schools become apparent only to employers and
to officials at higher levels of government. The whole community loses because
the work force is less efficient and it becomes difficult to attract new
industry. This is precisely the reason why employers, governors and state
legislatures have been the energizing force of school reform. State
governments, however, are far removed from the classroom and the instruments
available to them for imposing reform are limited. If students, parents and
school board officials perceive the rewards for learning to be minimal, state
efforts to improve the quality of education will not succeed.
Evidence of a Learning Response to Economic Incentives
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The tendency to under-reward effort and learning in school appears to
be a peculiarly American phenomenon. Grades in school are a crucial
determinant of which employer a German youth apprentices with. Top companies
in Japan and Europe often hire lifetime employees directly out of secondary
school. Teacher recommendations, grades in school, and scores on national
and provincial exams have a significant impact on who gets to work at the
more prestigious firms (Leestma, et. al., 1987). Japanese parents know that
their son or daughter's future economic and social rank in society critically
depends on how much he or she learns in secondary school. Furthermore,
learning achievement tends to be defined and measured relative to everyone
else in the state or nation and not just relative to one's classmates in the
school. Entry into the better high schools depends primarily on the child's
performance in junior high school, not on where the parents can afford to
live as occurs in the US. These are the reasons why Japanese parents demand
so much of their children and of their schools. This is why Japanese 5th
graders spend 32.6 hours a week in academic activities while American youth
devote only 19.6 hours to their studies (stevenson, Lee and Stigler 1986).
Japanese adolescents work extremely hard in high school, but once they
have entered college, they stop working. For most students a country club
atmosphere prevails. The reason for the change in behavior is that employers
apparently care only about which university the youth attends, not about the
individual's academic achievement at the university. Working hard is not
a national character trait, it is a response to the way Japanese society
rewards academic achievement.
American students, in contrast, take it easy in high school but generally
work quite hard in college. This change is due, in part, to the fact that
academic achievement in college has important effects on labor market success.
When higher level jobs requiring a bachelors or associates degree are being
filled, employers pay much more attention to grades and teacher recommendations
than when they hire high school graduates. The NFIB survey found that when
someone with 16 or more years of schooling was hired, 26 percent of the
employers had reviewed the college transcript before making the selection,
7.8 percent had obtained a recommendation from a major professor and 6.3
percent had obtained a recommendation from a professor outside of the graduates
major or from the colleges's placement office.
PART II. SORTING EFFECTS
Hunter and Schmidt (1982) employ Brogden's formula to calculate the effect
of test use on the efficiency of the economy's matching of workers to jobs.
In this context Brogden's formula can be viewed as a way of representing the
derivative of a worker's true productivity measured in dollars with respect







They point out that tests are more valid predictors of job performance (eg.
have higher rTP) in the more complex jobs that are traditionally better paid
and therefore probably also have larger standard deviations of productivity
in a dollar metric, SD(pt). When this is the case, output will increase if
high scoring individuals are recruited into the most complex jobs and low
scoring individuals are recruited into the less complex jobs. They make a
simplifying assumption that the ratio of the standard deviation of output
in dollars to the wage is the same in all jobs but argue it is quite large,
about 40 percent of salary. Under this assumption, they calculate that
distributing all workers across four major occupational categories on the
basis of a single measure of academic ability will raise productivity 4 percent
above the level resulting from random assignment of workers to major
occupational category. They also report that assigning workers on the basis
of a simple multi-variate selection model involving tests of perceptual speed
and spatial ability as well as academic ability would increase productivity
by 8 percent relative to random assignment.
However, since people are already recruited into high status jobs on
the basis of years of schooling, SAT scores, college major, grades, previous
work experience and performance in past jobs (which have independent
associations with job performance and together explain much of the variance
of test scores), greater use of tests by employers would probably have much
smaller effects on national output than those calculated by Hunter and Schmidt.
Hunter and Schmidt acknowledge this when they say, "Employers do not select
randomly from among applicant pools many of these [selection] procedures
have low validity, but average productivity levels associated with current
methods are certainly above those that would result from random selection
20
from applicant pools, though less effective than our univariate selection
strategy (p. 270)". Michael Rothschild (1979) has proposed two other sources
of upward bias in their estimate. He argues that the assumption of optimal
placement is unreasonable. Tests would never be used by all firms, for all
jobs and optimally in every case, so the full benefits calculated would never
be realized. A second source of bias, in Rothschild's view, is the possibility
that errors in measuring productivity may be positively correlated with test
score, and that consequently the estimates of true validity and the standard
deviation of true output used in the analysis may be biased. Hunter and
Schmidt argue to the contrary that their estimates are conservative because
they assume that (1) coefficients of variation of productivity are the same
for all occupations, (2) at most three test scores are used to reassign workers
and (3) only 4 categories of occupations are analyzed. They point out that
these features of the calculation cause it to understate the effects of greater
test use on national productivity.
The only way to analyze whether the His estimates are too high or too
low is to change as many of the problematic assumptions as possible and then
redo the calculation. That is what will be attempted in this part of the
paper. The objective is an improved estimate of the magnitude of the
efficiency gains that may result from greater test use, not a definitive
estimate. In the current state of knowledge, a definitive estimate is
infeasible for some important sources of bias cannot be eliminated. There
is no way of knowing, for example, how effectively tests will be incorporated
into selection decisions and whether the measurement errors of job performance
are correlated with test scores or not, so it will not be possible to formally
address two of Rothschild's objections to His's estimates. Most of the factors
that Hunter and Schmidt argue cause their estimates to be conservative are
dealt with, however, so the resulting estimates are probably upper bounds
on the likely impact of greater test use on the productivity of the economy.
Greater use of tests will increase aggregate output either if tests are
more valid predictors of job performance in some jobs than others or if
improvements in job performance have larger effects on output valued in dollars
in some occupations than others. I begin, therefore, by examining how test
validity varies across occupations. This is accomplished by estimating
"structural" models of relative productivity as a function of three tests
21
scores (general academic achievement, perceptual speed and psychomotor skills),
years of schooling, age, total occupational experience, tenure, gender, race
and Hispanic background for 8 different occupational categories in the United
states Employment Service's General Aptitude Test Battery Revalidation
Individual Data File.
The next step is a review of the literature on how variable output is
across workers doing the same job and how this variability is affected by
the nature of the job. The major finding here is that the standard deviation
of output is substantially higher in the more cognitively complex and better
paid jobs.
The effect of alternative ways of assigning workers to jobs is calculated
by simulating such changes in the USES Individual Data File after reweighting
it to be representative of all workers outside of professional, managerial
and sales representative occupations. The parameters of the "structural"
models are used to predict the productivity (in standard deviation units)
during the first ten years on the job of all 31,399 workers in the data set
in each of the 8 occupational categories analyzed. The mean predicted
productivity of workers who currently occupy each job is then compared to
the productivity that would result from (1) a random assignment of new hires
to jobs and (2) a resorting of new hires across jobs based on the productivity
predictions generated by regression equations similar to the structural models
but absent data on gender, race and Hispanic background. These results are
then translated into a dollar metric by rnultplying changes in mean productivity
in standard deviation units by estimates of the standard deviation of
productivity in dollars obtained from the literature review. The impact of
reassignment based on test scores on the gender, racial, and Hispanic
composition of each occupation is also simulated and discussed. Part 2 then
concludes with a critique of the estimated "structural" models of job
performance and the resulting estimates of productivity gains from resorting
the workforce on the basis of employment tests.
2.1 ANALYSIS OF GATB VALIDATION STUDIES
Data on the relative productivity of a large and reasonably representative
sample of workers is available from the US Employment Service's program for
revalidating the General Aptitude Test Battery (GATB). This data set contains
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data on job performance, the 9 GATB "aptitudes" and background data on 36,614
individuals in 159 different occupations. Professional, managerial and high
level sales occupations were not studied but the sample is quite representative
of the rest of the occupational distribution. It ranges from drafters and
laboratory testers to hotel clerks and knitting-machine operators. The
simulations of the effect of changes in selection policies are also conducted
in this data set after it has been reweighted to be representative of the
71,132,000 workers who are employed in these occupations.
Since a major purpose of these validation studies was to examine the
effects of race and ethnicity on the validity of the GATB, the firms that
were selected tended to have an integrated workforce in that occupation.
Firms that used aptitude tests similar to the GATB for selecting new hires
for the job being studied were excluded. The employment service officials
who conducted these studies report that this last requirement did not result
in the exclusion of many firms. A total of 3052 employers participated.
Each worker took the GATB test battery and supplied information on their
age, education, plant experience and total experience. Plant experience was
defined as years working in that occupation for the current employer. Total
experience was defined as years working in the occupation for all employers.
The dependent variable for this study is a sum of two separate administrations
(generally two weeks apart) of the Standard Descriptive Rating Scale. This
rating scale (available from the author), obtains supervisory ratings of 5
aspects of job performance (quantity, quality, accuracy, job knowledge and
job versatility) as well as an "all around" performance rating. Some studies
employed rating scales specifically designed for that occupation and in one
case a work sample was one of the job performance measures. None of the
studies used ticket earnings from a piece rate pay system as the criterion.
studies which used course grades or tests of job knowledge as a criterion
were excluded. Firms with only one employee in the job classification were
excluded, as were individuals whose reported work experience was inconsistent
with their age.
Academic achievement is the sum of two GATB composites, G and N, that
have been put into a population SD metric by dividing by 38.8. The G composite
is an average of normalized scores on a vocabulary test, an arithmetic
reasoning test and a 3-dimensional spatial relations test. The mathematical
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achievement index (N) is an average of normalized scores on the same arithmetic
reasoning test and on a numerical computations test. These two GATB composites
were aggregated together because previous analyses had found that when both
were entered simultaneously into models predicting relative job performance,
the coefficients on both composites were very similar (Bishop 1987).
Perceptual Speed is the sum of the P and Q aptitudes of the GATB divided by
36.72 to put it in a population SO metric. Psychomotor Ability is the sum
of the K, F and M aptitudes of the GATB divided by 51.54 to put it in a
population SO metric.
Because wage rates, average productivity levels and the standards used
to rate employees vary from plant to plant, mean differences in ratings across
establishments have no real meaning. Only deviations in rated performance
from the mean for the establishment (Rmj) were analyzed. The variance of
the job performance distribution was also standardized across establishments
by dividing (Rmij-Rmj) by the standard deviation of performance calculated
for that firm (or 3 if the sample SO is less than 3).9 The model that was
fitted to the data was the following:
(2) Rmij-Rmj = Rij-Rj = Bo + Bl(Tij-Tj) + B2(Sij-Sj) + B3(Xij-Xj) + Vl
SOj(Rmij)
where Tij is a vector of the three GATB composites and Sij is the schooling
of the ith individual. Tj and Sj are the means of test scores and schooling
for the jth establishment. Two models were estimated for each major
occupation. In the first model, the vector of individual characteristics,
Xij-Xj, included the deviations from the firm's mean of gender, Black,
Hispanic, age, age squared, plant experience, plant experience squared, total
occupational experience and total occupational experience squared. The
calculation of the effects on aggregate output of reassigning workers to jobs
that is carried out in section 2.3 is based on the predictions of this model.
It should be recognized that because of the selectivity of the application
and hiring process and of turnover and promotions, the results obtained from
fitting this model are not estimates of the true structural relationships
prevailing in the full population (Brown 1978; Mueser and Maloney 1987).
Since no data sets exist which would enable analysts to model these selection
processes, estimates of the true population relationships do not appear to
be feasible. An effort will be made in section 2.4 to discuss how the
24
simulation results would probably change if better estimates of true population
relationships were available.
In the second model, gender, race and Hispanic were not included. Because
it is illegal for firms to select workers on the basis of gender, race and
ethnicity, the selection process must be assumed to ignore this information
so the simulation exercise conducted in section 2.3 assumes that workers are
assigned to jobs on the basis of performance predictions generated by model
two.
The results of estimating Model 2 are presented in Table 5. When test
scores are controlled, years of schooling appear to have very small and
sometimes negative effects on job performance. 10 The effects of the three
test score composites are reported in columns 2-4 of the table. When the
metric of job performance is within-job standard deviations, academic
achievement has roughly comparable effects on job performance in all
occupations except operatives and sales clerks. The effect of academic
achievement on the performance of operatives is highly significant but only
about two-thirds of the size of the other occupations. Perceptual speed has
smaller effects on job performance, but the coefficients are nevertheless
significant in all but technical and sales clerk (where the sample is quite
small) occupations. Psychomotor skills are significantly related to
performance in all occupations but in the better paid and more complex jobs
the magnitude of the effect is only about one-third of that of academic
achievement. The effect of psychomotor skills is larger in the three least
skilled occupations--operatives, sales clerks and service except police and
fire. For operatives and sales clerks the impact of psychomotor skills is
roughly comparable to the impacts of academic achievement. These results
are consistent with previous literature (Hunter 1983). Models were estimated
containing squared terms for academic achievement and psychomotor skills but
these additions did not produce significant reductions in the residual
variance. Estimating model 1 by adding dummy variables for gender, race and
Hispanic to model 2, tends to reduce test score coefficients a little but
the pattern remains the same.
The effects of occupational experience and tenure are also quite
substantial for all occupations except for sales clerks. The negative
coefficients on the square terms for occupational experience and tenure imply
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they are subject to diminishing returns. For workers who have no previous
experience in the field, the expected gain in job performance is about 12-
13 percent of a standard deviation in the first year and about 8-9 percent
of an SD in the fifth year. The effect of tenure on job performance stops
rising and starts to decline somewhere between 16 and 24 years of tenure.
Increases in occupational experience lose their positive effect on performance
even later--at 37 years for operatives, at over 55 years for craft workers
and high skill clerical workers and at 19-31 years for other occupations.
Except for technicians, age has large curvilinear effects on job performance
as well.
The substantial effects of age and previous occupational experience on
job performance are consistent with current hiring practices which give great
weight to these job qualifications. These results suggest that a job applicant
who has age and relevant work experience in his favor but low test scores
may nevertheless be preferable to a young applicant who has high test scores
but no relevant work experience. This is particularly likely to be the case
if turnover rates are high for the productivity benefits of age and previous
relevant work experience are large initially but diminish with time on the
job. These results point to the desireability of studying the effects of
test scores on job performance in the context of a multivariate model which
includes controls for as many other factors as possible. They also remind
us that employment tests should never be the sole criterion by which workers
are selected. Tests would supplement not displace other criteria for selecting
the best job candidate.
2.2 A REVIEW OF STUDIES OF OUTPUT VARIABILITY
The second determinant of the payoff to using tests to select workers
is the extent of the variability across workers in their productivity on the
job. A search for studies of output variability yielded 49 published and
8 unpublished papers covering 94 distinct jobs. The results are summarized
in column 1 of table 7 and column 2 of table 6. (The detailed results are
reported in Appendix tables 1 through 4). Most of the studies reviewed
measured physical amounts of output produced over periods generally lasting
one to four weeks and report a ratio of the standard deviation of output to
mean output, coefficient of variation or CV. Relative output levels vary
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over time, so coefficients of variation for a one or five year period are
inevitably smaller than the coefficients of variation for a one or two week
period. Hunter, Schmidt and Judiesch (1988) review a number of studies which
provide evidence on the correlation between output levels over time and how
these correlations vary with the length of the time interval studied. This
information was then used to construct estimates of the output CVs for periods
of a year or more. It is these corrected estimates of the CV which are
reported. For semi-skilled factory jobs paid on an hourly basis the
coefficient of variation averaged about 14 percent. Output variability is
greater in the higher paid technical and precision production jobs. The
coefficient of variation averages 27.6 percent in craft jobs and 33.8 percent
in technical jobs.
Clerical jobs were divided into a high skill and low skill categories.
The description of the job in the Dictionary of Occupational Titles was
reviewed and jobs which appeared to require greater skill or involve discretion
and decision making were classified as "high skill clerical." Jobs which
were included in this category were stenographer, computer operator,
administrative clerk, supply specialist, claims processor, head teller, ticket
agent, customer service representative and teacher aide. Jobs categorized
as "routine" were key punch operator, hotel clerk, cashier-checker, telephone
operator, mail carriers, file clerks, stock clerk, typists, and toll ticket
sorters. This distinction appears to be a real one for the high skill
clerical jobs were generally better paid than the routine clerical jobs and
the workers in these jobs scored one third of a standard deviation higher
on the GATB academic achievement composite than those who occupied the more
routine clerical jobs. Furthermore, the variability of job performance appears
to be substantially greater in the jobs that require decision making. The
coefficient of variation was 25.5 in the high skill clerical jobs and 16.7
percent in the routine jobs.
Data was available for only three service occupations. These three jobs
represent too small a sample to produce reliable estimates of the CV for all
service jobs except police and fire fighting so the estimate of the service
CV employed in the paper is an unweighted average of the CVs for operatives,
low skill clerical workers and 20.6, the average for the three service jobs
for which there is data on the variability of output. For sale clerks records
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of sales transactions were employed to calculate the CV and the result was
an estimate of 29.8 percent.
When a firm expands by hiring extra workers, it incurs significant fixed
costs. It must rent space, buy equipment, hire supervisors and recruit, hire,
train, and payroll the additional production workers. If output can be
increased by hiring more competent workers, all of these costs can be avoided
and the firm's capital becomes more productive. These factors tend to magnify
the effects of work force quality on productivity. They imply that the ratio
of the standard deviation of worker productivity in dollars (SD$) to average
worker compensation is much larger than the productivity CV for that job
(Klein, Spady and Weiss 1983; Frank 1984).
Estimates of productivity standard deviations (SD$) in 1985 dollars
are reported in column 2 of the table 6. In most cases the author of the
study made no attempt to estimate SD$'s, so estimates of SD$ were derived
as a product of the CV, the mean compensation for that job and 1.52, the ratio
of value added to compensation for private non-farm business excluding mining,
trade, finance and real estate. The value added to compensation ratio in
retailing and in real estate was much too high to be used as an adjustment
factor. So for all sales occupations it was assumed that SD$ = CV times
average compensation. The SD$ that result are $13,668 for technicians, $12,399
for craft workers, $5062 for semiskilled factory jobs, $8925 for high-skill
clerical jobs, $4934 for routine clerical jobs, $4068 for service workers
other than police and fire fighters and $5228 for sales clerks. While it
is possible to debate the accuracy of specific estimates and the reliability
of the 15th, 50th, and 85th percentile method of measuring SD$, the basic
pattern of rapidly increasing standard deviations of output as one move up
in the occupational distribution is unlikely to be disturbed by new data or
a revised methodology.
What about jobs where capital equipment controls the pace of work?
It has been argued that in automated continuous process industries the amount
and quality of output is determined by technology and computer programs not
by the skills and talents of the workers. In fact, however, programs cannot
be written to handle all contingencies and machines are never completely
reliable so human operators have an important role to play (Hirschorn 1984;
Adler 1986). In capital intensive industries with high rates of energy and
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materials consumption, small errors can cause substantial losses. Small
adjustments which increase fuel efficiency can save a utility or refinery
millions of dollars a week. This has been demonstrated by a very careful
study of the variability of the job performance of the operators of electric
utility plants(see Table A2). In the study of the operators of electric
generating plants commissioned by the Edison Electric Institute, committees
of technical experts were organized and asked to make consensus estimates
of the frequency and costs of the most common types of operator errors. Once
the relationship between specific operator errors and the purchase costs of
replacement power was established, the experts estimated what would be expected
(in dollar terms) from an operator at the 15th, 50th and 85th percentile of
job performance. The study concluded that the standard deviation for the
productivity of control room operators is about $278,000 in 1985 dollars at
nuclear plants and $115,000 at fossil fuel plants (Dunnette et al 1982).1
When the results of Wroten's study of output variability among refinery
operators is combined with the results of the Dunnette et al study, the
estimated SD$ for this small but very important set of jobs is $91,020.
SD$ of plant operators is more than 6 times larger than any of the other
occupations in the USES Individual Data File. As a result, resorting to
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maximize total output implies that workers who would be above average producers
in all occupations should be assigned to this occupation.
2.3 SIMULATION RESULTS
The question posed in this section is "What will happen to aggregate
output and to the gender and ethnic composition of various occupations, if
firms are allowed and/or encouraged to use employment tests to select new
hires?" To simulate the effect of changes in the allocation of workers across
jobs on aggregate output, one needs estimates of how the effects of test scores
and other worker characteristics on productivity vary across jobs. If the
data were available, we would want to estimate, for random samples of the
population, linear regressions in which the true relative productivity in
dollars, ptij-ptj, of the ith worker in the jth job is a function of the
worker's characteristics. Unfortunately, in most studies the only indicators
of productivity are supervisory ratings which are not defined on a ratio scale
and have only limited reliability. If, however, outside estimates of the
standard deviation of true productivity, SDj(ptij), are available and
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assumptions are made about the measurement error in these ratings, estimates
of the effect of test scores on true productivity in that occupation can be
derived from regression models in which ratings are predicted by test scores
and other worker characteristics. The measurement assumptions made by Hunter




where rpp is the reliability of supervisory ratings (eg. the correlation
between independent ratings by two different supervisors) and v is uncorrelated
with true productivity. The upper bound on the reliability of job performance
measures like the Standard Descriptive Rating Scale has been found to be .6
(King, Hunter and Schmidt, 1980). In other words, the ratings of relative
job performance are assumed to be cardinal measures of productivity that are
linearly related to true productivity and that errors in assessing productivity
are negatively associated with true productivity. This assumption implies
that measurement error in the dependent variable attenuates the true
relationship and that the impact of a right hand side variable on true
productivity in standard deviation units can be calculated by multiplying
the coefficients reported in Table 5 by 1.29, the inverse of the square root
of criterion reliability. It is further assumed that SDj(ptij) is equal to
the SD$j, the standard deviation of productivity in dollars discussed in
section 2.2. While these assumptions may seem reasonable, there do not appear
to be any studies which have demonstrated even, in one particular case, that
errors in assessing job performance are negatively correlated with true
productivity and that SDj(ptij) = SD$j. On the other hand, there also appears
to be no evidence that these assumptions are wrong. To facilitate comparisons
with previous literature, the calculations of output effects presented below
are based on the assumptions detailed above.
The second problem that must be dealt with is the fact that job
performance outcomes have been used to select the sample used in the analyses.
Since incompetent workers are fired or induced to quit and high performing
workers are promoted to jobs of a higher classification, job incumbants are
a restricted sample of the people originally hired for a job (Bishop 1988).
The systematic nature of attrition from the job substantially reduces the
variance of job performance and biases coefficients of estimated job
~performance models toward zero. When all variables are multivariate normal,
the ratio of the coefficients estimated in the selected sample to the true
coefficient estimated in an unselected population is equal to:
(4) 8*/B VR/(1-R2(1-VR» VR + R*2(1-VR)
where VR is the ratio of the variance of y in the selected sample to its
variance in the full population, R2 is the multiple coefficient of
determination of y on
~
in the full population and R*2 is the multiple
coefficient of determination of y on
~
in the selected population (Goldberger
1981). Estimates of VR, the ratio of incumbant job performance variance to
new hire job performance variance can be derived from the NCRVE employer survey
analyzed in Bishop (1987, 1988). Using reported productivity in the 3rd
through 13th week after being hired for two different workers as the data,
a variance ratio was calculated by dividing job performance variance of
incumbants (pairs of workers both of whom were still at the firm at the time
of the interview a year or so after being hired) by the job performance
variance of a group of very recent hires (pairs of workers both of whom stayed
at least 13 weeks but who mayor may not have remained at the firm through
the interview). The resulting estimate of VR was .486. Assuming multi-variate
normality and noting that the R2 of the models in table 5 averages about .16,
our estimate of B/B*, the multiplier for transforming the coefficients
estimated in the selected sample into estimates of population parameters,
is 1.76.
The Productivity Loss from Random Assignment of Workers to Jobs
The first simulation exercise is a comparison of the mean predicted
productivity of workers who currently occupy each job to the productivity
that would result from a random assignment of new hires to jobs. ~e
parameters of the first model were used to predict the productivity (in
standard deviation units) during each of the first ten years on the job of
all 31,399 workers in the data set in each of the 8 occupational categories
analyzed. The effects of age and previous occupational experience at the
time of hire were included along with test scores, schooling, gender and
ethnicity. A present discounted value of each worker's predicted productivity
during the first ten years was then calculated under the assumption of a 6
percent real interest rate and a monthly turnover rate of 1 percent. Based
on occupation, race and Hispanic status, each worker was assigned a weight
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so that the USES Individual Data File would become representative of all
71,132,000 workers in these 8 occupations (see Appendix Table B1 for a
description of how these weights were derived). The weighted mean present
value of predicted productivity resulting from random assignment of new hires
to occupations was then subtracted from the weighted mean present value of
predicted productivity during the first ten. years on the job for the current
set of individuals in that occupation. This was then translated into dollars
by multiplying first by 1.29, second by 1.76 and then by the SD$~ for that
occupation.
The results of this simulation exercise are presented in Table 6. The
loss in productivity that would result from random assignment of workers to
jobs is estimated to be about $1800 dollars per worker or 8 percent of mean
compensation. The aggregate loss is $129 billion in 1985 dollars. The
reductions in productivity primarily occur because: (1) workers who had higher
than average productivity during their early years at the firm due to previous
experience in the occupation are often randomly assigned to an occupation
where this previous experience is of no value and (2) workers with high test
scores are much less likely to be assigned to high skill jobs which use their
talents than is the case currently. These results are clearly an extreme
lower bound estimate of the benefits (relative to random assignment) of the
current process of matching workers to jobs. If other worker characteristics
such as occupationally specific education, tastes and talents for particular
occupations and performance in previous similar jobs had been included in
the model, estimates of productivity loss resulting from random assignment
of workers to occupations would have been substantially greater.
Re-Sorting Workers on the Basis of Test Scores
The effect of greater use of employment tests to select workers on
productivity was explored by simulating the effects of reassigning new hires
on the basis of the productivity predictions derived from model 2. A present
discounted productivity (for the first ten years after being hired) was
calculated for each worker in each occupation. The 8 occupations were arrayed
in a hierarchy according to the magnitude of the dollar change in productivity
that results from a unit change in academic achievement. Plant operators
were at the top of the hierarchy. The computer program sorted all workers
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by the present discounted value of their predicted productivity as plant
operators (based on model 2) and then assigned just enough people from the
top of that ranking to fill all 228,000 of the nation's plant operator jobs.
The remaining workers were then sorted by their productivity in technical
occupations and those found at the top of the ranking were assigned to these
occupations until all 5,261,000 technical jobs were filled. This procedure
was repeated next for craft jobs, then for high skill clerical jobs, for low
skill clerical jobs, for service jobs, and for operative jobs.
over after operatives were selected became sales clerks.11
Those left
The simulated
effects of this reassignment scheme on productivity are presented in Table
7. output rises by $1561 per worker or by 6.9 percent of mean compensation.
The total gain from applying this plan to the 71 million workers represented
in the data base is $111 billion. There are major improvements in the
productivity of plant operators, technicians and craft workers which more
than offset large declines in the productivity of operatives and sales clerks.
The simulated effect of the reassignment scheme on the mean test scores,
schooling and demographic character of each occupation is presented in the
even numbered columns of Table 8. The characteristics of those who are
crrently in each occupation are presented in the odd numbered columns.
Currently workers in technical and high skill clerical occupations have the
highest academic achievement and operatives and service workers have the
lowest. The simulation results in the workers with the stongest academic
achievement being reassigned to plant operator, technical and craft occupations
and the workers with the weakest academic achievement being reassigned to
operative and sales clerk occupations. Some of the changes are truly dramatic-
-the mean test score of plant operators rises by 2 population standard
deviations and the mean score of sales clerks falls by 1.6 population standard
deviations. This outcome is a result of placing the plant operator occupation
at the top of the hierarchy and the sales clerk occupation at the bottom.
The simulation also produces an increase in the schooling of plant operators
and a decline in the mean schooling of sales clerks.
Reassigning workers on the basis of test scores, age and previous work
experience but not gender or ethnicity produces large changes in the
demographic composition of some occupations. Women end up with most (77
percent) of the plant operator jobs and roughly half of the craft jobs.
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Occupations which have historically been predominantly female become more
evenly split between men and women. As anticipated, black representation
decreases in plant operator, technical, craft, clerical and service occupations
and increases in operative and sales clerk occupations. Similar but more
modest changes occur for Hispanics. Since, however, employers know the
minority status of job applicants, the adverse impact on minorities of using
tests to select employees can be eliminated by within-group scoring of the
tests or by other affirmative action efforts.
How do these results compare to those of Hunter and Schmidt (1982)?
The estimated total effect of going from random selection of new hires to
optimal use of tests, age and previous work experience is 15 percent of the
compensation of workers subject to reassignment. This is much larger than
the 8 percent figure His obtain in their three test score selection model
when SD$ is 40 percent of each occupation's mean compensation. The reasons
for the discrepancy are: (a) the estimates of differences in SDY across
occupations are much larger than the one's assumed in their simulation, (b)
the restriction of range correction (which was based on actual data on the
reductions in job performance variance resulting from the selective nature
of turnover) is larger than the one they assumed, (c) job assignment is based
on a composite of test scores, schooling, age and previous occupational work
experience that has greater validity than test scores alone and (d) 8 rather
than 4 occupational categories are analyzed.
2.4 A CRITIQUE OF THE SIMULATIONS
The simulation results just presented are based on a maintained
assumption that the models of relative job performance described in section
2.1 (which were estimated in samples of job incumbents) are, after the
correction for errors in measurement and restriction of range, unbiased
estimates of true population relationships. This assumption is almost
certainly incorrect and this inevitably results in the findings of the
simulation exercise being biased as well. The underlying performance model
is biased for two reasons: omitted variables and the selection process that
determines which members of the population are hired for the job.
While model 1 is a more complete specification than is typically found
in the literature, it lacks controls for important characteristics of the
worker which are often known by hiring decision makers and which are
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associated with worker productivity. Examples of things left out of the model
are occupationally specific schooling, grades in relevant subjects in school,
reputation of the school, the amount and quality of previous on-the-job
training, performance in previous jobs, interview performance, physical
strength and a desire to work in the occupation. Quite clearly, if random
assignment of new hires to jobs involves ignoring all of this additional
information as well as information on schooling and years of experience in
the occupation, the loss in productivity would be substantially larger than
the numbers reported in table 6.
The omission of so many important determinants of job performance also
biases the simulations of the impact of greater test use. If these variables
had been included in the job performance models, the coefficients on test
scores would probably have been smaller and adding test scores to the factors
considered in hiring selections would have resulted in fewer workers being
reassigned. This in turn reduces the output gain that results from greater
use of employment tests for selection and exaggerates the predicted changes
in demographic composition of occupational work forces.
The other source of problems is selection effects. The selectivity bias
caused by turnover and promotion decisions that depend on realized levels
of job performance has already been discussed and corrected for. Another
form of selectivity bias is introduced by the selection that precedes the
hiring decision. If hiring selections were based entirely on X variables
included in the model, un standardized coefficients such as B would be unbiased
and correction formulas would be available for calculating standardized
coefficients and validities. Unfortunately, however, incidental selection
based on unobservables such as interview performance and recommendations is
very probable (Thorndike 1949; Olson and Becker 1983; Mueser and Maloney 1987).
In a selected sample like accepted job applicants, one cannot argue that these
omitted unobservable variables are uncorrelated with the included variables
that were used to make initial hiring decisions and, therefore, that
coefficients on included variables are unbiased. When someone with 10 years
of formal schooling is hired for a job that normally requires an associates
degree, there is probably a reason for that decision. The employer saw
something positive in that job applicant (maybe the applicant received a
particularly strong recommendation from previous employers) that led to the
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decision to make an exception to the rule that new hires should have an
associates degree. The analyst is unaware of the positive recommendations,
does not include them in the job performance model and, as a result, the
coefficient on schooling is biased toward zero. This phenomenon also causes
the estimated effects of other worker traits used to select workers for the
job such as previous relevant work experience to be biased toward zero.
Variables which were not used to select new hires such as the GATB test scores
will probably have a positive correlation with the unobservable. Since the
unobservable probably has its own independent effect on job performance (ie
it is not serving solely as a proxy for test scores), test score coefficients
are likely to be positively biased. Mueser and Maloney (1987) experimented
with some plausible assumptions regarding this selection process and concluded
that coefficients on education were severely biased but that test validities
were not substantially changed when these incidental selection effects are
taken into account.
Consequently, the estimates of the effects of greater test use presented
in Table 7 almost certainly exaggerate its true effect. If the simulations
had been conducted using the true structural model of job performance rather
than the bias~d op~ tbat was available, many fewer people would have been
5~~'d~J
reassigned and/froductivity gains would have been smaller. still another
problem with the simulations is that they took no account of turnover risks.
The large effects of tenure on the productivity of plant operators, technicians
and craft workers implies that specific training is particulary important
in these occupations and that minimizing turnover should be an important goal
of a firm's hiring selections. Some of the workers assigned to plant operator
jobs in the simulation might have been college students working part time
who would have been unlikely to remain long in the job. As Mike Rothschild
has argued there are countless barriers to the complete reshuffling of the
work force that would be necessary for employme~~ testing to have its maximum
effect (the effect that is simulated in Table 7). Employers would have to
~
become much better informed about employment testing. If they all sought
advice from industrial psychologists, long queues would result and consulting
fees would skyrocket. Some test batteries are expensive to administer. If
a number of worker aptitudes are to be reliably measured, a couple of hours
must be devoted to the testing. This would impose a very serious burden on
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job seekers in some labor markets and many low wage industries would,
consequently, eschew testing altogether. The simulation model did not ask
the workers who were being transferred whether they wanted the higher paying
jobs. Some would have refused. The simulation ends gender segregation of
occupations and makes wholesale transfers of clerical workers to plant operator
and craft jobs. Improved structural models would probably reduce the size
of these shifts, but even more modest shifts would be difficult to pull off.
Affirmative action goals and/or the use of race normed test scores in selection
would also reduce the sorting impacts of greater test use. Clearly, the EEOC
regulation of employment testing is not the only barrier to a more efficient
allocation of workers across jobs and many of these other barriers would have
to fall before testing could have its full effect. Consequently, the likely
productivity benefits and resorting effects of allowing employers a free hand
with regard to employment testing are much smaller than those presented in
Table 7.
The simulated effects of substituting random selection of new hires for
the current job-worker matching system reported in Table 6 are, by contrast,
gross underestimates of the true costs. The selected nature of the sample
and the many variables omitted from the "structural" models of job performance,
cause very large biases in these simulations. Depending on how far one goes
down the road toward random selection, the loss in sorting efficiency might
be 2 or even 4 times those estimated.12 Rates of involuntary seperation would
increase and this would increase unemployment. In addition, economic
incentives to go to school and study hard would be greatly reduced and this
would cause further reductions in total output and standards of living.
These results suggest that the current system of matching workers to jobs
which makes almost no use of tests (tests were given prior to hiring in only
3.2 percent of hiring events sampled in the NFIB study) is not doing all that
bad a job. This conclusion would appear to contrast somewhat with Hunter
and Schmidt's (1983) characterization of current selection processes quoted
at the beginning of part 2.
On the more important issue of how increased employment testing will
effect national output, there is no real disagreement with Hunter and Schmidt.
The simulations imply that the improvements in the matching of workers to
jobs resulting from increased employment testing will significantly increase
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output. The 6.9 percent figure might fall to 2 or 3 percent of employee
compensation once one takes the biases and the barriers to optimal use of
tests into account. On the other hand, taking constraints off the use of
tests will also reduce tryout hiring and turnover, increase investment in
specific human capital and reduce aggregate unemployment (ie. the rate of
unemployment at which inflation begins to accelerate will fall if the minimum
wage constraint is not binding). These effects were not part of the
simulations. Since, however, total compensation of labor will exceed $3
trillion in 1988, extrapolation of these simulations to all workers implies
that the productivity gain from unconstrained employment testing would
eventually increase national income by 60 to 90 billion dollars and maybe
much more when the unemployment response is factored in. These effects would
not arrive suddenly for the tests only influence hiring decisions. CUrrent
employees would not be fired and replaced by new hires selected on the basis
of tests because the gains from better selection will seldom be sufficient
to justify firing employees who have developed extensive firm specific
knowledge. It would, therefore, be a generation before the full effect of
testing on the allocation of workers to jobs would be realized.
The $60 to $90 billion estimate is clearly a guess. A better estimate
of the effect of greater test use on sorting efficiency requires better
estimates of SOY, a better understanding of the magnitude and nature of the
biases in job performance models, a model of employment testing's effects
on turnover and unemployment and above all an understanding of how employers
would use tests if they were given the opportunity.
research is needed on these topics.
Clearly, much more
PART III. POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS
The findings presented in the first two parts of the paper imply that
improved signaling of worker skills and competencies to employers will probably
have significant positive effects on productivity and standard's of living.
Productivity gains occur both because more valid selection procedures improves
the match between workers and jobs and because the supply of workers with
the talents measured by the tests rises in response to the increase in labor
market rewards for the talents. The distributional consequences of greater
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test use are that it benefits women but tends to lower the representation
of Blacks and Hispanics in occupations where the payoff to cognitive skills
is particularly high such as plant operator, craft worker and technician.13
This adverse impact can be avoided, however, by race norming the test
scores (as the GATB currently does) and affirmative action. Consequently,
impacts on minority groups should not be the basis for deciding whether to
use an employment test or which test to use. other instruments are available
for achieving employer and societal goals regarding integration on the job
and the representativeness of a firm's workforce. When, however, it comes
to generating incentives to develop the skills needed on the job and efficient
matching of workers with talents to jobs, there appears to be no other
selection instrument that will sort efficiently while generating the correct
incentives. These are the two criteria by which alternative employee selection
policies should be evaluated.
of the paper.
That is the task undertaken in the remainder
Sorting efficiency will tend to be maximized when employment tests are
part of the selection process for jobs in which the particular competencies
measured by the tests have a particulary high productivity payoff. In other
words, effort should be made to maximize differential validity.
be used but they should supplement not displace consideration of
Tests should
occupationally relevant training and experience. If most of the people hired
into an entry job move up to other more responsible positions, the criteria
applied at the port of entry needs to take the higher level jobs into account.
The analysis presented in the first part of the paper implies that student
incentives to learn and parental incentives to demand a quality education
are maximized when the following is true: (1) significant economic rewards
depend directly and visibly on academic accomplishments, (2) the accomplishment
is defined relative to an externally imposed standard of achievement and not
relative to one's classmates, (3) the reward is received immediately, (4)
everyone, including those who begin high school with serious academic
deficiencies, has an achievable goal which will generate a significant reward
and (5) progress toward the goal can be monitored by the student, parents
and teacher.
We will see shortly that it is not easy to design a system of signaling
and certifying academic achievement which satisfies all of these requirements.
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Consequently, it will generally be desireable to use more than one signal
of academic achievement and to use different signals when selecting for
different jobs. Let us examine the alternatives.
Diplomas:
From the point of view of incentives, the standard high school diploma
satisfies requirement 2, 3, 4 and 5 but it fails to satisfy requirement #
1, the most critical requirement of all. Minimum competency tests for
receiving a high school diploma are an improvement, for they are an example
of an externally imposed standard of achievement. They are a step in the
right direction, especially when they are taken early in high school, and
remedial classes are offered after school and during the summer for those
who fail on the first try. However, some students arrive in high school so
far behind that setting a high minimum would cause many to give up trying.
Consequently, the minimum standard is not set very high and fails to challenge
most students.
Schooling is a valid predictor of job performance but to a great degree
its validity derives from its correlation with test scores. The evidence
on its incremental contribution to validity once test scores are controlled
is more mixed. The estimations reported in Table 5 found very weak effects
of schooling but this is probably an artifact of the selection biases discussed
in section 2.4 (Mueser and Maloney 1988). Selection into the military is
based explicitly on the test scores and high school graduation, not on
unobservables as in the civilian sector. Since selection is based on X
variables, selection effects can be corrected for (Dunbar and Linn 1986).
Analysis of military data finds that high school graduation has its own unique
impacts when test scores are controlled.
Weiss's (1985) study of Western Electric employees found that completing
high school is a valid predictor of low absenteeism and low turnover but not
job performance. Thus even when studies find that graduating from high school
has little effect on job performance, it appears to effect retention.
Consequently, from a sorting efficiency point of view, the high school diploma
probably belongs on the list of credentials considered by employers even when
test scores are available.
Competency Profiles:
40
Competency profiles are check lists of competencies that a student has
developed through study and practice. The ratings of competence that appear
on a competency profile are relative to an absolute standard, not relative
to other students in the class. By evaluating students against an absolute
standard, the competency profile prevents one student's effort from negatively
affecting the grades received by other students. It encourages students to
share their knowledge and teach each other.
A second advantage of the competency profile approach to evaluation is
that students can see their progress as new skills are learned and checked
off. The skills not yet checked off are the learning goals for the future.
Seeing such a check list getting filled up is inherently reinforcing.
With a competency profile system, goals can be tailored to the student's
interests and capabilities, and progress toward these goals can be monitored
and rewarded. Students who have difficulty in their required academic subjects
can, nevertheless, take pride in the occupational competencies that they are
developing and which are now recognized just as prominently as course grades
in academic subjects. Upon graduation, the competency profile would be encased
in plastic and serve as a credential certifying occupational competencies.
If the ratings by teachers (and the sponsoring employers of cooperative
education students) are reliable indicators of competence, employers will
find this information very valuable, and the students who build a good record
will be handsomely rewarded. I am not aware of any studies of the validity
of school developed competency profiles.
Hiring Based on Grades in High School:
Using grades to select new hires results in a very visible dependence
of labor market outcomes on an indicator of academic accomplishment. There
are, however, two disadvantages. It results in zero-sum competition between
classmates and consequently contributes to peer pressure against studying
and parental apathy about the quality of teaching and the rigor of the
curriculum. The second problem is that it induces students to select easy
courses which tend to cause grade inflation. These problems can be mitigated
somewhat if employers take the rigor of courses into account when evaluating
grades, give preference to schools with tough grading standards, and vary
the number hired from particular schools in response to the actual job
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performance of past hires from that school.
From the employer's point of view, the disadvantage of high school GPA
is that it is difficult to adjust these grades for the grading standards of
the school but without such adjustment grades may have rather low validity.
Most of the published studies of the validity of grades probably used
information that had been collected by the firm when hiring decisions were
being made. As a result, most of the validity coefficients reported for grades
are probably negatively biased by the selection effects discussed in section
2.4.
Job Tryout and Promotions Based on Performance:
From the point of view of motivating students to study, the problem with
job tryout and performance reward systems is that the dependence of labor
market outcomes on academic achievements is both invisible and considerably
delayed.
From the employer's point of view, the disadvantages of job tryout are
the costs of training workers who end up being fired, its unpopularity with
workers who will spend months unemployed if they are fired, and its potential
for generating grievances. 14 Performance evaluations are known to be
unreliable, and this makes workers reluctant to take jobs in which next year's
pay is highly contingent on one supervisor's opinion. Pay that is highly
contingent on performance can also weaken cooperation and generate incentives
to sabotage others. The benefits of performance reward systems are that they
motivate better performance, they tend to attract high performers to the firm,
and they tend to induce the high performers to stay at the firm. When these
factors are balanced, it appears that most workers and employers choose
compensation schemes in which differentials in relative productivity result
in relatively small wage differentials (Bishop 1987).
IQ Tests:
students, parents and teachers view IQ tests as measuring something that
schools do not teach. Even though this public perception is not entirely
correct, the perception is not likely to change in the near future, so hiring
on the basis of IQ tests fails requirement # 1. Students will not see the
connection between how hard they study and higher IQ scores. Other problems
with this approach are that IQ tests are less valid than broad spectrum
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achievement tests like the ASVAB and individually administered IQ tests are
too expensive and cannot be made secure.
Job Knowledge Tests:
From the point of view of learning incentives, the disadvantage of job
knowledge tests is that they do not generate incentives to study math, science,
history and literature and may induce students to over-specialize in school.
If at some point in their career a job in the field for which they prepared
is not available, they are left high and dry.
From the point of view of sorting efficiency, job knowledge tests have
much to recommend them for they maximize differential validity. They are
particularly appropriate if the applicants vary in their knowledge and
background in the occupation and training costs are substantial. If new hires
are likely to be quickly promoted into higher level jobs, the job knowledge
test should also cover the skills required in these jobs. Job knowledge tests
are less useful when none of the applicants has experience in the field and
training costs are low. The possibility of court challenges complicates
matters here for validity generalization may not apply, and each job knowledge
test may have to stand on its own merits. Development costs are high, so
small occupations may never have job knowledge tests developed for them.
Broad Spectrum Achievement Tests:
From the point of view of incentives to study a broad range of academic
subjects, broad spectrum achievement tests such as the ASVAB are the best
of the alternatives reviewed so far. If some of the subtests in the battery
include material covered in the standard college prep high school curriculum
such as algebra, statistics, chemistry, physics and computers, the use of
such tests for selection would generate parental pressure for an upgraded
curriculum and encourage high school students to take more rigorous courses.
When many employers use achievement tests to select new employees, everyone
who wants a good job faces a strong incentive to study, and those not planning
to go to college will find the incentive especially strong. The best paying
firms will find they can set higher test score cutoffs than low paying firms,
so the reward for learning will become continuous. Whether one begins 9th
grade way behind or way ahead, there will be a benefit on the margin to
studying hard for it will improve one's job prospects.
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Broad spectrum achievement tests covering science, computers, mechanical
principles, and technology as well as mathematics, reading and vocabulary
are the preferred method of assessing general cognitive skills from the
employer's point of view as well. Test batteries which cover the full spectrum
of knowledge and skills taught in high school are more valid predictors of
job performance than tests which assess math and verbal skills only. Evidence
for this statement comes from examining the relative contributions of various
subtests to the total validity of the ASVAB battery. Sims and Hiatt's (1981)
analysis of the job performance of 23,061 Marine recruits found, for example,
that validity (corrected for restriction of range) was .38 for auto shop
information, .43 for mechanical comprehension, .42 for electronics information,
.46 for general science, .42 for word knowledge, .50 for mathematics knowledge,
and .48 for arithmetic reasoning. Tests measuring electronics, mechanical,
automotive and shop knowledge--material that is generally studied only in
vocational courses--have high validity. Analyzing this and other military
data sets, Hunter, Crosson and Friedman (1985) concluded that the "general
cognitive ability" construct that best predicted performance in all military
jobs included subtests in general science, electronics information, mechanical
comprehension and mathematics knowledge as well as conventional word knowledge
and arithmetic reasoning subtests. The addition of these four subtests to
the construct increased validity by 9 percent and the proportion of true job
performance variance explained from .306 to .364. They also found that auto
and shop information significantly improved the prediction of performance
in jobs in the mechanical job family. I suspect that tests measuring
understanding of statistics, business, economics, marketing and psychology
would similarly improve the validity of batteries used to select workers for
most white collar jobs in the private sector.
Will the courts allow firms to use broad spectrum achievement tests
covering subjects not offered until the final years of high school? My fear
is that, since the research on test validity in the civilian sector has used
the GATB almost exclusively, everyone may be forced to use reading, vocabulary,
and arithmetic reasoning tests that are demonstrably similar to their GATB
counterparts. If the studies of the ASVAB's validity in predicting performance
in military jobs were not accepted as evidence for similar jobs in the civilian
sector, it might be a decade before tests measuring general science and
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electronics knowledge could be used as a general selection device for blue
collar jobs. Courts might require that employers demonstrate that each item
on a science test have a specific application in each job for which it is
a proposed selection device. To avoid having to redesign the test for each
job, test developers would dumb the test down and include only simple questions
covering scientific principles that are learned in grade school. Costly
validity studies covering tens of thousands of workers might be necessary
before broad spectrum achievement tests covering the material included in
rigorous high school courses have their validity generalized and become
available as selection tools.
To maximize the incentive effects, it is essential that students, parents
and teachers be aware that local employers are using tests for selection and
what kind of material is included on these tests. Employers should seek out
ways of publicizing their use of broad spectrum achievement tests.
Unfortunately, the fear of litigation may cause employers to give only limited
publicity to their use of tests and so constrain the type of tests that are
used that many of the potential beneficial incentive effects of employment
testing may never be realized.
Performance on Achievement Exams Taken at the End of Secondary School
In Japan and most European countries, the educational system administers
achievement test batteries (eg. the
'a' and 'A' Levels in the UK, the
Baccalaureate in France) which are closely tied to the curriculum. These
are not minimum competency exams. Excellence is recognized as well as
competence. In France, for example, students who pass the Baccalaureate may
receive a "Tr~s Bien", a "Bien", an "Assez Bien" or just a plain pass. Most
job applications request information on which exams were taken and what scores
were obtained on each exam. These exams generate credentials which signal
academic achievement to all employers and not just the employers who choose
to give employment tests. The connection between one's effort in school and
performance on these exams is clearly visible to all. Consequently, school
sponsored achievement exams like those used in Europe would have much stronger
incentive effects than employer administered broad spectrum achievement tests.
This approach to signaling academic achievement has a number of
advantages. Because it is centralized and students take the exam only once,
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job applicants do not have to take a different exam at each firm they apply
to and the quality and comprehensiveness of the test can be much greater.
There is no need for multiple versions of the same test and it is much easier
to keep the test secure. By retaining control of exam content, educators
and the public influence the kinds of academic achievement that are rewarded
by the labor market. Societal decisions regarding the curriculum (eg. all
students should read Shakespeare's plays and understand the Magna Charta)
tend to be reinforced by employer hiring decisions. Tests developed solely
for employee selection purposes would probably place less emphasis on
Shakespeare and the Magna Charta.
The disadvantages of schools administering the achievement exams is that
students have only one chance to demonstrate their competence. If one has
an off day, a year typically must pass before the exam can be retaken. With
employer administered exams, having an off day is less damaging for one will
shortly have a chance to do better at another employer. Employers may also
find it is easier to compare job applicants who have all taken the same
employer administered exam.
With regard to validity, there is probably little to choose between the
two systems. Separate scores are reported for each subject so employers may
focus on the tests which have special relevance to their jobs. School
administered tests are more reliable measures of achievement because they
sample a much larger portion of the student's knowledge of the field (the
ASVAB General Science subtest, by contrast, allows the student 11 minutes
to do 24 items). They may also be more valid because they are not limited
to the multiple choice format. Thus, even though the topics covered in the
school exam are probably less relevant to the firm's jobs, the school exam




1. Gottfredson (1988) argues against race norming on the grounds that it will
produce a white backlash and is counter to democratic principles. I did
not, however, find her argument persuasive. In the first place, there
are equities on both sides of the issue. Many whites support special
preferences in employment for blacks to try to undo the effects of centuries
of slavery and discrimination. There may be instances in which affirmative
action has produced a backlash but for most whites it is a low priority
concern. In any case, a person's views on this issue are determined largely
by values, not scientifically verifiable facts.
2. If Americans born between 1897 and 1901 are compared to those born 50 years
later, the proportion born on a farm fell from 42.4 percent to 10.6 percent,
the proportion growing up in a broken family fell from 17 to 13 percent,
the average number of siblings fell from 4.8 to 3.3, and father's average
years of schooling rose from 6.9 years to 10.7 years. (Hauser and
Featherman, 1976). Time spent in school has increased dramatically.
Between 1890 and 1960, the average length of the school term increased
19 percent, average daily attendance rates rose 40 percent and mean years
of schooling completed increased more than 50 percent.
3. Estimates of how IQ changed as a cohort aged can be obtained by comparing
young adults in the WAIS standardization to the people 25 years older in
the WAIS-R standardization. This comparison suggests that for Verbal IQ
the 20-29 year olds in 1953/54 gained 4.7 points (.315 SOs) in 25 years
and the 30-39 year olds gained 2.85 points (.19 SOs). For Full Scale IQ,
which contains the nonverbal performance tests all of which are timed,
small declines occurred: -0.2 IQ points (-.013 SOs) for the 20-29 year
olds and -2.3 IQ points (-.16 SOs) for the 30-39 year olds.
4. The Wells Alpha scores were translated into Army Alpha scores using a table
of percentile equivalents developed by Lorge (1936). Means were then
calculated and compared to the mean of the WWI army recruits using the
SO of the WWI sample for a metric. The resulting estimate of the gain
between WWI and WWII is smaller than that reported by Tuddenham. This
estimate of the GIA gain for army recruits may well underestimate the GIA
gain for all youth. The WWI army sample appears to have been more selected.
Veterans of WWII accounted for 77 percent of all males 20-29 in 1947, while
only 38.5 percent of the men 20-29 in 1920 were veterans of WWI. The sample
used by Tuddenham was selected on the basis of AGCT scores to yield a
distribution like that of inductees entering during 1943. During much
of 1943 there were no limitations on recruitment of illiterates.
(Oepartment of the Army, 1965) Illiterate recruits included in the
representative sample of WWII recruits took the Wells Alpha along with
everyone else. During WWI 25 percent of all recruits and 17 percent of
white recruits either could not read or write or had fewer than four or
six (depending on the army processing center) years of schooling and took
the Beta exam instead of the Alpha. They were, therefore, not part of
the WWI sample.
5. The ITEO was revised six times between 1942 and 1985 to incorporate
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changes in curriculum. Scores on the new versions of the test were
made equivalent to the old by administering the old and new test to
large samples of students (in a way that insured random assignment of
test version to individual students) and then equating them using the
equal percentile method. Trends were translated into population standard
deviation units by multiplying scores standardized using the sample
standard deviation for Iowa seniors by .74.
6. Similar results are obtained for other test combinations. For example,
alternative form reliabilities average .75 for 7 SRA subtests and .87 for
the G aptitude of the GATB. The G aptitude of the GATB has an average
correlation of .7 with the 7 SRA subtests, .75 with the WAIS verbal IQ,
.78 with the ITED composite and .81 with the ACT composite (Hunter, Crosson
& Friedman 1985; Department of Labor 1970). Jencks and Crouse (1982) make
this same point in an article that proposes using achievement tests rather
than aptitude tests for college admissions decisions.
7. For 12th graders such an improvement is approximately equal to 3.5 grade
equivalents. By reporting the percentage changes in labor market outcomes
that result from a one standard deviation change in GPA or performance
on a test, we make the results of studies done on very different cohorts
of workers comparable over time and understandable to the layman.
8. Studies that measure output for different workers in the same job at the
same firm, using physical output as a criterion, have found that the
standard deviation of output varies with job complexity and averages about
.164 in routine clerical jobs and .278 in clerical jobs with decision making
responsibilities (Hunter, Schmidt and Judiesch 1988). Since there are fixed
costs to employing an individual (facilities, equipment, light, heat and
overhead functions such as hiring and payrolling), the coefficient of
variation of marginal products of individuals will be considerably greater
(Klein, Spady, and Weiss 1983). On the assumption that the coefficient
of variation of marginal productivity for clerical jobs is 30
percent[1.5*(.33*.278+.67*.164»), a .5 validity for general mental ability
implies that an academic achievement differential between two individuals
of one standard deviation (in a distribution of high school graduates)
is associated with a productivity differential in the job of about 11
percent (.5*.74*30%). The ratio of the high school graduate test score
standard deviation to the population standard deviation is assumed to be
.74. For a more thorough discussion of the evidence on this issue see
Bishop 1987b.
9. The formula was SD(Rmj) = (Rmij-Rmj)2/N-l. Occasionally employers who
had only 2 or 3 employees gave them all the same rating. Consequently,
a lower bound of 40 percent of the mean SD(Rmj) was placed on the value
the SD could take. Models were also estimated which did not standardize
job performance variance across firms and which instead standardized the
variances only across the occupation. None of the substantive findings
were changed by this alternative methodology.
10. Mueser and Maloney (1988) argue persuasively that since schooling is a
very important factor in the selection process, the coefficients on
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schooling in estimations like these are negatively biased estimates of
true population relationships. This argument probably applies as well
to the coefficients on work experience in the occupation but not at the
firm.
11. This hierarchical process for allocating new hires to jobs is not fully
optimal. Some workers will not be assigned to the occupation in which
they have the greatest comparative advantage. A computer program that
assigns all new hires optimally would be much more complex. Given the
biased nature of the underlying models of job performance it is not clear
that the extra investment in programming time would be worthwhile.
12. The legal theories that have been used to attack employment tests on EEO
grounds are equally applicable to other selection criteria. If the theory
of differential validity by subgroup and employer were applied to selection
criteria like years of schooling, school reputation, GPA and recommendations
from previous employers (all of which have adverse impact), these criteria
would probably fail court tests for jobs like those in the GATB Revalidation
data. If the 1970s trend of court decisions restricting employer
prerogatives to select the "best" job applicant had continued rather than
being reversed, we might have moved a considerable distance down the road
toward random selection of new hires for these jobs. Sandra Day OConnor's
concurring opinion in Watson (1988) signals a major shift in the application
of the Griggs adverse impact test, so the trend now seems to be in the
direction of greater freedom for the employer.
13. This adverse impact results not because tests are unfair but because
academic achievement contributes to worker productivity and because there
are, unfortunately, real differences in mean levels of academic achievement
between groups (Jones 1988). The tests are giving us the unhappy news
that educational opportunities and achievement have not been equalized.
The cause of the situation is the low quality of the education that so
many Blacks and Hispanics received in segregated schools. Progress has
been made in reducing these quality differentials and achievement gaps
are diminishing. This means the problem will diminish over time, but racial
differences in the average academic achievement of adults will not disappear
quickly.
14. Mueser and Maloney (1987) develop a model of job tryout hiring which they
claim implies that it may be efficient to ignore available information
on stable worker competencies signaled by high test scores. They apparently
do not recognize that the model also implies that information on education
and previous work experience should also be ignored. They acknowledge
that "Although employing applicants for long enough to observe performance
entails costs of training and lost productivity, it may increase the
incentives workers have to apply effort to learning their jobs by enough
to compensate for such costs." In fact, however, turnover costs are so
large--training costs are generally about one month's wages and fired
workers suffer a couple of months of unemployment--, that a sequential
decision strategy will always dominate the strategy they consider. It
will hardly ever be optimal to hire ten people for one position and then
fire 9 of them after a tryout. In any job requiring even a modest amount
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of specific training or transitional unemployment, the optimal strategy
is to use all the inexpensive information available to make an initial
selection and then to give those selected a tryout but to plan on seldom
having to fire the new employee. It is true, however, that the option
of firing the worst performers results in Brogden's formula overstating
the private benefits of a selection method.
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16-17 .007 .229 .009
-.253 -.028 .009
18-19 .142 .254 .004
-.075 .052 .005
20-24 .277 .759 .019 .065 .507 .018
25-29 .414 .251
.829 .022 .697 .022
30-34 .156 .055
35-39 .223 .169
.439 .013 .429 .013
40-44 .000 .051
45-49 -.067 .054








Yrly Diff by Age
25-35 to 55-64
.027 .027 .013 .014
Sample Size 1880 1100 1880 1100
The table reports the mean score for specific age groups relative to grand mean
in the 1953-54 WAIS standardization divided by an average of age specific
standard deviations. It was derived from table 10 in Wechsler (1955) and table
7 of Wechsler (1981). The WAIS and WAIS-R were normed on representative samples
of the U.S. population. The five equivalence studies used to determine the
difference between the mean IQ of the two standardization samples (6.37 pts
for Full Scale IQ and 6.48 pts for Verbal IQ) are referenced in the text.
Table 2
Increases in IQ Test Scores Over Time
IQ Point
Country Gain Period Test Age Group status
United states 11.0 1918-1943 Ariny--Wells Alpha 18-33 (4)
6.0 1932-1953 SB--WAIS 16-48 3
9.9 1932-1971 SB-LM--SB-72 2-18 2
6.4 1954-1978 WAIS--WAIS:R 16-70 (3)
5.3 1942-1987 ITED-Iowa Seniors 17 (3)
United Kingdom 7.4 1939-1979 Ravens 8-30 3
France 25.1 1949-1974 Ravens 18 3
9.4 1949-1974 Verbal & Math 18 3
Japan 20.0 1951-1975 Wechsler 6-15 3/4
Netherlands 20.0 1952-1982 Ravens 18 1
Norway 8.8 1954-1968 Ravens 19 1
8.2 1954-1968 Verbal & Math 19 1
Edmonton, Canada 11.0 1956-1977 CTMM 9 1
Belgium 6.8 1958-1967 Ravens/Shapes 18 1
3.7 1958-1967 Verbal/Math 18 1
Note: WAIS--WAIS:R, ITED and Army Alpha results are discussed in the text.
For all other comparisons the source is Flynn 1987. SB stands for Stanford
Binet,CTMM stands for California Test of Mental Maturity, ITED stands for Iowa
Test of Educational Development, and Ravens stands for the Ravens Progressive
Matrices test of Abstract Reasoning. All tests have been adjusted to give them
a standard deviation of 15. Flynn's classification of the reliability of the
estimate is given in the column headed by status. It has the following key 1 =
verified, 2 = probable, 3 = tentative, and 4 = speculative. The status
classifications in parenthesis were assigned by the author.
Test Date
1971 1973 1975 1978 1980 1982 1984 1986
Reading
At Age 17 5.3 5.0 4.8 3.3 2.6
At Age 13 4.2 3.9 3.3 2.8 2.3
Math
At Age 17 4.0 3.8 3.2 2.9
At Age 13 4.6 4.2 3.4 2.4
Table 3
Racial Gap in Reading and Math Proficiency
[In Grade Equivalent Units]
Source: National Assessment of Educational Progress, The Reading Report Card. 1985,
Data Appendix and Who Reads Best?, February 1988, Table 1.1. The difference between
the scores of 17 year olds and 9 year olds was 75 points on the NAEP scale used
in the report covering 1971 through 1984 and 18 on the scale used in the report
on the 1986 assessment. Consequently, a grade equivalent unit was defined as 9.375
points on the NAEP scale used in the 1971-84 report and 2.25 points on the scale
used in the report on the 1986 assessment. The Mathematics Report Card. June
1988, Figure 1.2. The difference between the scores of 17 year olds and 9 year
olds was 80.3 points on the NAEP scale. Consequently, a grade equivalent unit
was defined as 10 points on the NAEP scale.
Date Percent Change
of Achievement in Wage Rate
Study and Data Set Graduation Age Measures Male Female
Wage Rates
Kang & Bishop (1985) 1980 19 Test-Math,Voc,Read
-1.9 -.5
High School & Beyond GPA in Grade 12 .6 2.2
Gardner (1983) 1976-1982 19-24 AFQT 4.8 4.8
NLS Youth
Daymont & Rumberger 1976-1979 19-21 GPA in Grade 9 .3 2.7
NLS Youth (1982)
Meyer (1982) 1972 19 Class Rank Grade 12 0.0 2.5
(Weekly earnings) Test Composite 1.2 2.2
Class of 1972
Earnings
Hause (1975) 1961 19 IQ,Test-Math -3.7
Project Talent (white) 23 IQ,Test-Math 6.1
Table 4
Effect of Academic Achievement
on the Wage Rates of High School Graduates
The table reports the percentage response of the wage rate or earnings to a one
standard deviation improvement in a measure of academic achievement. For high
school seniors a one standard deviation differential on an achievement test is
about equal to 3.5 grade level equivalents or 110 points on the Verbal SAT. For
GPA, one standard deviation is about .7 when C's = 2.0, B's = 3.0 and A's = 4.0.
TABLE 5
DETERMINANTSOF RELATIVE JOB PERFORMANCE
Yrs of Academic Perceptual Psychomotor Age Occ Occ Exp Tenure
Schooling Achievement Speed Skills ~~~Square Tenure Square
.JL
--.1!
Plant Operators -.013 .244*** .112* .111** .048* -.00053 .024 -.00039 .096* -.002 .181 651( .43) (3.89) (1.68) (2.30) ( 1. 69) (1.45) (.51) (.28) (1.93) (1.36)
Technician .028* .211*** .024 .111*** -.005 -.00008 .041*** -.00091** .084** -.0023*** .115 2384
(1.15) (8.25) (.12) (4.35) (.33) (.36) (2.93) (2.11) (5.41) (3.66)
craftWorkers
-.011** .249*** .060** .019*** .046*** -.00065*** .046*** -.00034*** .064*** -.0016*** .141 10061
(2.48) (15.00) (3.36) (5.96) (5.86) (6.51) (8.43) (2.21) (11.31) (8.60)
High Skill Clerical .013
.212*** .085*** .094*** .035** -.00051** .020 -.00011 .111*** -.00316*** .145 2510
(.82) (8.15) (3.11) (3.63) (2.31) (2.55) (1.35) (.36) (1.35) (5.01)
Low Skill Clerical -.015 .296*** .101*** .092*** .035*** -.00051** .042*** -.00090** .095*** -.0021*** .135 4124( 1. 28) (11.91) (4.43) (4.48) (3.46) (4.29) (3.36) (2.15) (6.13) (4.94)
Service
-.024 .298*** .012** .138*** .045*** -.00056*** .084*** -.0022*** .052*** -.0012 .152 1928
(1.45) (8.14) (1.96) (4.65) (3.43) (3.28) (5.16) (4.16) (2.10) (1. 61)
Operatives ,.
-.049** .189*** .019*** .140*** .041*** -.00064*** .038*** -.00052 .018*** -.00166*** .131 8161
Laborers (6.59) (10.65) (4.31) (9.53) (6.62) (6.19) (3.11) (1.58) (1.38) (4.65)
Sales Clerks
-.024 .119 .118 .161** .011*** -.00084** -.009 .0012 .026 -.0008 .081 411
(.10) (1.34) (1.41) (2.38) (2.63) (2.45) (.26) (1.08) (.62) (.50)
-~.
Table 6
LOSS IN PRODUCTIVITY IF
RANDOMASSIGNMENT WERE SUBSTITUTED
FOR THE CURRENT ALLOCATION OF WORKERS
[LOWER BOUND ESTIMATE]
Number
Average Standard Loss of Aggregate
Compensation Deviation Per Workers Loss
per FTK of Output Worker (1000's) (billions)
Plant Operators $33,808 $91,020 -$9,652 228
-$ 2.3
Technicians $26,649 $13,668 -$8,672 5261
-$45.6
Craft Workers $29,655 $12,399 -$3,700 13073
-$48.4
High Skill
Clerical $23,065 $ 8,925 -$4,914 5227 -$25.7
Routine Clerical $19,472 $ 4,934 -$1,512 12082 -$18.3
Service &xc.
Police & Fire $15,496 $ 4,068 +$ 889 12724 $11.3
Operatives & $23,828 $ 5,062 +$ 250 16816 $ 4.2
Laborers
Sales Clerks $17 ,542 $ 5,228 -$ 723 5682 -$ 4.0
All Workers $22,566 $ 6,708 -$1,815 71,132 -$128.7
Estimates compare the predicted productivity of current members of each occupation
with the mean predicted productivity in that occupation of everyone in the USES
data set. Predicted job performance was calculated using Model 1, the best
fitting model of job performance which included individual variables for gender,
race and Hispanic. Dollar impacts were then calculated by first adjusting for
the unreliability of the criterion in the standard manner (i.e. dividing by
.6), then correcting for restriction of range by multiplying by 1.76 and then
multiplying by the standard deviation of output in dollars (column 2 of Table
7) . ]
Table 7
THE EFFECT OF RE-SORTING
ON AGGREGATE OUTPUT
[UPPER BOUND ESTIMATE]
Coefficient Impact of Resorting Aggregate
of on Average output Gain
Variation (billions $)
Percent Dollars
Plant Operators $159,282 36.3
Technicians 33.8 17.8 $ 12,661 66.1
Craft Workers 21.6 1.1 $ 5,623 13.6
High Skill
Clerical 25.5 .9 $ 579 3.0
Routine Clerical 16.1 .6 $ 190 2.3
Service Exc.
Police & Fire 17.3 1.3 $ 531 6.9
Operatives & 14.0 -3.4 -$ 2,152 -36.3
Laborers
Sales Clerks 29.8 -23.8 -$ 1,322 -41.5
All Workers $ 1,558 111.0
Estimates compare the predicted productivity of current members of each
occupation with the predicted productivity of those assigned on the basis of
model 2 (which ignores race and ethnicity). Model 2 performance prediction
were made for each occupation and each worker. Because the standard deviation
of output measured in dollars of plant operators was so high, this occupation
got first pick. Then came technicians, craft occupations etc. Those not
selected for one of the top 1 occupations became sales clerks. Once workers
were assigned to occupations on the basis of Model 2, predicted job performance
was then calculated using Model I, the best fitting model of job performance
which included individual variables for gender, race and Hispanic. Dollar
.impacts were then calculated by first adjusting for the unreliability of the
criterion in the standard manner (Le., dividing by .6), multiplying by 1.16
to correct for range restriction and then Dlltiplying by the standard deviation
of output in dollars (column 2 of Table 1).]
Table 8
THE EFFECT OF '!'HE RE-SORTING
ON THE ABILITY, GENDERAND ETHNICITY
OF OCCUPATIONS
General
Ability Percent Percent Percent
(Pop SD's) Education Female Black HiSPanic
CUrrent Change CUrrent Change CUrrent Change CUrrent Change CUrrent Change
Level Level Level Level Level
Plant Operator .09 +2.03 12.1 2.09 2 +75 11.1 -11 5.1 -5
Technician .28 1.03 13.7 .22 55 +1 8.1
- 6 3.4 -1
Craft -.09 .65 11.9 .53 4 +43 7.1 - 4 7.4 -3
High Skill
Clerical .32 .02 12.9 .67 83 -16 10.1 - 4 5.4 -1
Low Skill
Clerical .00 .03 12.6 -.48 82 -18 10.6 - 4 5.7 0
Service Exc.
Police & Fire -.52 .12 11.8 .01 82 -14 18.0 - 6 8.3 0
Operative -.59 -.46 11.3 -.01 66 0 14.7 + 7 10.0 +2
Sales Clerk -.02 -1.59 12.3 -1.00 86 -20 8.2 +24 5.6 +3
All Occupations -.21 12.1 62 11.9 7.3
This table rePOrts the gender, ethnicity, schooling and test scores of current members of each occupation and the
changes in each of these variables that would result if new hires had been selected on the basis of the Model 2
predicted productivity regressions (which ignore race and ethnicity). The simulation was conducted by first
calculating the Model. 2 performance predictions for each worker in each occupation. Because the standard
deviation of output measured in dollars of plant operators was so high, this occupation got first pick. Then
came technicians, craft occupations etc. Those not selected for one of the top 7 occupations became sales clerks-
